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Most contemporary family law scholarship assumes the propriety of a DNA
default for establishing parenthood—a presumption that, in the absence of
marriage, whoever had the sex with the mother that resulted in the child should
be the father of the child. This Article problematizes the DNA default. It
demonstrates how the DNA default necessarily magnifies the legal and social
importance of sex, discounts the legal significance of women’s reproductive
labor, and marginalizes all children living outside the binary, heteronormative
model that a genetic regime necessarily edifies. When scrutinized, the DNA
default looks just as moralistic and exclusionary as a parentage regime rooted
in marriage. Very few people in contemporary family-law scholarship
acknowledge this problem, even as they fault the law for not being attentive to
the struggles of nonmarital parents. Attending to the needs of nonmarital
parents requires asking the preliminary question of who should be considered a
parent, especially because in low-income communities, where marriage is rare
and the DNA default has the most salience, the DNA default fails to do the job
it was originally designed to do: provide for children. This Article echoes the
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call for the law to support nonmarital parenting, but it challenges both scholars
and the law to be much more careful when deciding how to fill the gap left by
rejecting marriage as the root of parentage. It suggests that the law should
expand the paradigms used in adoption and reproductive technology contracts
by trying to replicate the cooperative norms engendered by marriage to fill the
void left by nonmarriage with a parental registration regime capacious enough
to include pluralistic family forms and sensible enough to demythologize sex.
INTRODUCTION
A majority of the children in this country have their legal parentage
determined by reference to the mother’s marriage: the spouse of the woman who
gives birth is the legal parent of the born child.1 This marital presumption now
usually applies to both opposite- and same-sex couples.2 A much smaller group
of children has its parentage determined by the granting of a state license to
adults who apply to be parents (i.e., adoption) or of reproductive technology
contracts (i.e., surrogacy or sperm donation). The rest of the children in this
country—approximately forty percent—have their parentage determined by a
DNA default, a presumption that whoever had the sex with the mother that
resulted in the pregnancy is the father of the child.3

1 The marital presumption can sometimes be overcome with genetic evidence, but states
vary considerably on who has standing to present such evidence and when. See generally
JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE
AMERICAN FAMILY 138-40 (2014) (explaining different state approaches to overcoming the
marital presumption of paternity).
2 The National Center for Lesbian Rights writes that, “[w]hen a legally married couple has
a child, they are both automatically presumed to be the legal parents of the child. This means
that, if they get divorced, they both remain legal parents unless a court terminates one or both
of their parental rights. This presumption applies to same-sex parents when children are born
to couples who are married or where their state recognizes their civil union or comprehensive
domestic partnership at the time the child is born.” NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, LEGAL
FAMILIES 1 (2016),
http://www.nclrights.org/wpRECOGNITION OF LGBT
content/uploads/2013/07/Legal_Recognition_of_LGBT_Families.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P7D3-HZAM]. States that resist this idea tend to also resist same-sex
marriage. See Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L.
REV. 1185, 1242-44 (2016) (detailing some states’ use of biological factors to undermine the
marital presumption of parenthood for same-sex couples). Most same-sex couples have been
successful in demanding that the marital presumption be applied to them. E.g., Gartner v.
Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335, 351 (Iowa 2013) (finding that same-sex couples
and marital couples are similarly situated for purposes of the marital presumption).
3 Of the children born in the United States, 40.7% of them are born to unwed mothers.
Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2011, 62 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., no. 1, June
28, 2013, at 1, 3, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr62_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/83Z25VY4]. Some of these children are born to single women, who are single by choice, and have
gotten pregnant pursuant to a contract with a sperm provider or sperm bank. Others are women
who have gotten pregnant through intercourse but have chosen not to name another parent.
Most of the mothers of this 40.7% of children cosign a Voluntary Acknowledgement of
Paternity (“VAP”), which operates as a determination of fatherhood in the signatory, based
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This Article problematizes that DNA default. It upends the seemingly
unassailable assumption that genetic progenitors are the adults to whom the law
should assign parental status.4 In doing so, this Article echoes, but also
challenges the common call in contemporary family-law scholarship for the law
to support nonmarital parenting. Rejecting marriage as the paradigm for
determining parentage is a laudable and overdue goal, but reformers must be
more wary of what fills the void left by rejecting marriage. Currently, in most
instances, if marriage does not determine parentage, genetics do. Using genetics
to determine legal parentage is just as political as is using marriage to determine
legal parentage.5 This Article argues it is a problematic political choice.
The DNA default magnifies the legal and social importance of sex. It roots
parenthood in the sexual act, not in an intent to procreate or an agreement to
parent or an ability to parent. When compared to how the law determines
parenthood in cases of noncoital conception, the DNA default emerges as a
massive, punitive regulation of sex. The DNA default also elevates genetic
contributions over other biological and physical contributions to children. It
makes a man’s singular contribution to the reproductive process the sine qua
non of parenthood, thus erasing the legal significance of women’s reproductive
labor. A genetic regime also necessarily reifies a heteronormative vision of
parenting. It treats as inevitable a paradigm of two and only two parents, one
male and one female.6 In short, the DNA default embodies a vision of parenting
that should be viewed with skepticism by most of those calling on the law to
alter its paradigms for determining parentage.

on genetic connection. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (detailing VAP form
questions, and shortcomings).
4 Glenn Cohen has questioned the inevitability of the genetic presumption, arguing that,
in the context of assisted reproduction, men have the right to be anonymous sperm donors.
See I. Glenn Cohen, Response: Rethinking Sperm-Donation Anonymity: Of Changed Selves,
Nonidentity, and One-Night Stands, 100 GEO. L.J. 431, 432 (2012) (arguing that the
movement to forbid sperm-donor anonymity is misguided) [hereinafter Cohen, Rethinking
Sperm-Donation Anonymity]; I. Glenn Cohen, The Right Not to Be a Genetic Parent, 81 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1115, 1121 (2008) (arguing that the rights to be a genetic, gestational, and/or
legal parent do not stand and fall together).
5 One of the greatest dangers of the DNA default is that it treats parenthood as a “natural”
relationship. It helps hide the inherently political nature of assigning parentage to certain
individuals. As Martha Nussbaum notes “the name ‘family’ is a legal and political matter,
never one to be decided simply by the parties themselves. . . . [I]t is the state that says what
this thing is and controls how one becomes a member of it.” Martha C. Nussbaum, The Future
of Feminist Liberalism, in THE SUBJECT OF CARE: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON DEPENDENCY
186, 199 (Eva Feder Kittay & Ellen K. Feder eds., 2002); see also MAXINE EICHNER, THE
SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND AMERICA’S POLITICAL IDEALS 14, 53
(2010) (“[W]hat counts as a family is inherently intertwined with politics and power. . . . The
issue of what constitutes a family is not a pre-political question that can be determined based
on science or nature . . . .”).
6 See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
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Making genetics determinative of parenthood is all the more questionable
once one realizes that, in practice, the DNA default rarely does what it was
designed to do. The law has used the DNA default primarily to find parents for
children who might otherwise become dependent on the state.7 Thus, the DNA
default is also deeply classed; it determines fatherhood for the majority of lowincome children, and only rarely for middle- and upper-middle-class children.8
Many people agree that the current law of parenthood imposes unrealistic
financial obligations on low-income genetic fathers,9 but several contemporary
commentators also argue that these men need more legal protection in order to
secure their rights as legal fathers.10 This Article offers another solution: cease
treating many of these men as legal fathers at all.
Commentators tend to compare unwed genetic fathers to wed genetic
fathers,11 but “unwed families” are only necessarily similarly situated to “wed
families” if we believe that genetics must be relevant to family status. If we
remove genetics as the ubiquitous referent, the question becomes why not treat
unwed genetic fathers like sperm donors. Exploring why unwed genetic fathers
may be more like sperm donors than spouses leads to an analysis of why spouses,
who are or were married, tend to be more effective coparents than adults who
have not married. The marital presumption of parentage may be appropriate not
because of what it presumes about the genetic relationship between an adult and
a child, but because of what it presumes about the cooperative relationship
between adults.

7 See infra Part I. In some, but not all, situations, the law is comfortable with the idea of a
fatherless child. The children of lesbian couples often have no father, and the children of
single women who conceive asexually, with purchased or donated sperm, also do not have
fathers. See NeJaime, supra note 2, at 1240-41 (discussing instances in which the law
recognizes fatherless children).
8 See Sara McLanahan, Fragile Families and Children’s Opportunities 3 (Ctr. for
Research on Child Wellbeing & Fragile Families, Working Paper No. 12-21, 2012),
http://crcw.princeton.edu/workingpapers/WP12-21-FF.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4SJE-9JB6]
(pointing to statistics that indicate unmarried genetic parents who have children are much less
educated and much more likely to be poor than married parents).
9 CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 1, at 193 (“We propose an end to state insistence on
counterproductive child-support enforcement as a condition of state aid of any kind . . . .”);
Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for Nonmarital Families, 67
STAN. L. REV. 167, 171 (2015) (“Child support laws, which are relatively effective for
divorcing families, impose unrealistic obligations on unmarried fathers, many of whom have
dismal economic prospects.”); see also infra notes 164-79 (citing various sources criticizing
the challenges faced by low-income men who have significant child-support obligations).
10 KATHRYN EDIN & TIMOTHY NELSON, DOING THE BEST I CAN: FATHERHOOD IN THE
INNER CITY 215 (2013) (asserting that the legal system and policies that have created
“deadbeat dad” laws stoke a gendered battle in which fathers are disfavored); Solangel
Maldonado, Shared Parenting and Never-Married Families, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 632, 633
(2014) (contending that the legal system favors maternal residential custody and burdens the
person seeking shared parenting time).
11 See, e.g., Maldonado, supra note 10, at 636.
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The norms of interdependence, role sharing, and commitment that inform the
modern social meaning of marriage likely render the adults who enter it well
suited to jointly raise a child, regardless of whether the child is genetically
related to them and regardless of whether the adults stay married. Having sex
with someone, which is all that is required to trigger the DNA default, carries
no comparable package of social norms. Like almost all contemporary familylaw scholarship, this Article rejects marriage as the only legitimate root to
parenthood, but it further unpacks the work that marriage does in reinforcing
adults’ commitments to each other to suggest that it is the relationship between
adults that should be critical in assigning parental status to multiple adults.
The analysis proceeds as follows. Part I introduces the origins and
contemporary use of the DNA default. Part II explores how the DNA default
regulates sex, discounts women’s labor, and marginalizes significant
populations of children. It shows how the DNA default punishes men who do
not want to be parents, women who do not want to have to share parenting with
particular men, and children whose family structure does not, and very likely
never will, mimic the genetic ideal. When scrutinized, the DNA default looks
just as moralistic, restrictive, and exclusionary as a parentage regime rooted in
marriage.
Part III looks at the DNA default in practice today, particularly in the lowincome communities in which it is the primary means of assigning fatherhood.
It shows that the DNA default usually neither serves the goal it was designed to
serve, privatizing children’s dependency, nor provides children with adult
parents who can realistically help raise them. Child-rearing in most low-income,
nonmarital communities is far more gendered, far less mutual, and far less
cooperative than it is today for most married or divorced couples. The response
from many commentators has been to give genetic fathers more parental rights,12
but Part III argues that a better solution is not to assign fatherhood based on
genetics at all. Most unwed, low-income genetic fathers deserve relief from
cumbersome and counterproductive child support obligations, but affording
them greater parental rights will not provide children with the parents they need.
Dispensing with genetics as the root of parenthood will not necessarily make
men irrelevant in questions of parenthood. Instead, the law must design more
logical ways of assigning parentage. Marriage may be one, though certainly not
the only one, of those ways. Part IV analyzes the work that marriage does in

12

See EDIN & NELSON, supra note 10, 215 (discussing the lack of power conferred on
black unmarried fathers by a legal system that “tells them that they are a paycheck and nothing
more”); CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FlOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY
RELATIONSHIPS 114-15 (2014) (suggesting family law should evolve towards “preserving and
repairing relationships”); MERLE H. WEINER, A PARENT-PARTNER STATUS FOR AMERICAN
FAMILY LAW 506 (2015) (proposing a “parent-partner” status that would facilitate greater
father involvement with children); Huntington, supra note 9, at 171-72 (criticizing current
laws that allow nonmarital fathers’ time with their children to be controlled by maternal
“gatekeepers”); Maldonado, supra note 10, at 633 (“[B]y rejecting a presumption of shared
parenting, we in effect endorse the status quo.”).
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fostering coparenting. It shows how marriage assigns parentage regardless of
genetics and incorporates norms that make both adults responsible to each other
and the child in the child-rearing process.13 Because marriage has evolved into
what Serena Mayeri refers to as “a privileged status and a status of the
privileged,”14 the law needs alternatives to marriage for assigning parentage, but
there is no reason to ignore the positive work that marriage does in fostering
effective coparenting. There is robust evidence that children of married couples
do better on almost all measures than children raised outside of marriage.15
Something about marriage appears to be good for children.16 Part IV explores
what marriage likely does right in terms of coparenting so that the law can
develop legal structures that better serve the familial needs of both parents and
children.

13 See infra note Section IV.A (describing norms engendered by marriage that aid in child
rearing).
14 Serena Mayeri, Marital Supremacy and the Constitution of the Nonmarital Family, 103
CALIF. L. REV. 1277, 1283 (2015).
15 Correlation is not causation. See Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, The American
Family and Family Economics, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 19 (2007) (“Because family structure
is intertwined with other parental characteristics that affect children, a causal relationship
between family structure and child outcomes is difficult to establish.”). But, the correlation
between marriage and child wellbeing is strong. See Lisa Gennetian, One or Two Parents?
Half or Step Siblings? The Effect of Family Structure on Young Children’s Achievement, 18
J. POPULATION ECON. 415, 418 (2005) (“The more time a child spends in a single parent
family, the bigger the gap in cumulative investment between that child and a child in a twoparent family.”); Donna K. Ginther & Robert A. Pollak, Family Structure and Children’s
Educational Outcomes: Blended Families, Stylized Facts, and Descriptive Regressions, 41
DEMOGRAPHY 671, 676 (2004); Amy Wax, Traditionalism, Pluralism and Same-Sex
Marriage, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 377, 403-05 (citing studies on the effects of family structure
on children); Ryan Heath Bogle, Long-Term Cohabitation Among Unwed Parents:
Determinants and Consequences for Children 1 (Bowling Green State Univ. Ctr. for Family
& Demographic Research, Working Paper No. PWP-BGSU-2012-038, 2012),
http://papers.ccpr.ucla.edu/papers/PWP-BGSU-2012-038/PWP-BGSU-2012-038.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W4MM-6D7J] (citing studies showing that children of cohabitating unions
run a greater risk of disruption, and have a greater risk of cognitive, behavioral, and economic
trouble, than children of married parents). Some research suggests that being raised in the
same household by both genetic parents is more important to positive outcomes than
marriage. See Sandra L. Hofferth, Residential Father Family Type and Child Well-Being:
Investment Versus Selection, 43 DEMOGRAPHY 53, 55-56 (2006) (indicating that children
living with nongenetic fathers fare worse than children living with genetic fathers). But,
forcing genetic parents to live together in the same household does not appear to be a solution
that anyone endorses. And once the parents separate, what appears most important for
children is whether the adults with whom they live get along, not whether the children are
biologically related to the adults. See infra notes 197-98.
16 Ginther & Pollak, supra note 15, at 672 (reporting better outcomes for children reared
in traditional nuclear families than children reared in blended families); Robert Lerman &
Elaine Sorenson, Father Involvement with Their Nonmarital Children: Patterns,
Determinants, and Effects on Their Earnings, 29 MARRIAGE & FAM. REV. 137, 148 (2000)
(citing statistics that indicate that the stability of marriage promotes quality parenting).
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The analysis of marriage suggests that notions of formality or license and
mutual consent or contract, which already operate at the margins of the
assignment of parentage for adoptive families and families who use reproductive
technologies, provide useful constructs for trying to incorporate cooperative
commitment norms into parentage without relying on marriage itself. By
looking at how family law assigns parentage at the margins, this Article
ultimately shows how the law can fill the gap left by nonmarriage with what
matters to effective parenting, not genetics.
I.

ORIGINS AND CONTEMPORARY USE OF THE DNA DEFAULT

Parentage is a legal construct, which is important to underscore because
contemporary law and norms tend to treat genetic fatherhood as “true” and
“real.” Genetic fatherhood is inevitable in that each child must have a genetic
father, but there is no reason why genetic fatherhood must be legal fatherhood.
Under Roman law, a child’s parentage was based on the law’s recognition of the
mother’s partner, in either matrimony or legal concubinage.17 A child born to a
woman without a legally recognized partner was filius nullius, a child of no
one.18 If she could afford to, financially and socially, the mother was usually
allowed to rear the child.19 Thus, filius nullius are probably more accurately
described, in modern parlance, as children of single parents.
As the Roman Empire’s power faded and the Catholic Church became the
focal point of people’s social life, local parishes often accepted responsibility
for infants whose mothers could not afford to care for them alone.20 In an effort
to alleviate some of that burden, in 1234, Pope Clement III issued an edict
requiring fathers to support their nonmarital children.21 Pope Clement did not
use the term “genetic father,” but few doubt that what he meant by the term

17 R. H. Helmholz, Support Orders, Church Courts, and the Rule of Filius Nullius: A
Reassessment of the Common Law, 63 VA. L. REV. 431, 433 (1977) (stating that there was no
duty to support children born out of wedlock or concubinage).
18 Joseph Cullen Ayer, Jr., Legitimacy and Marriage, 16 HARV. L. REV. 22, 22 (1902).
19 See JOHN BOSWELL, THE KINDNESS OF STRANGERS: THE ABANDONMENT OF CHILDREN
IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM LATE ANTIQUITY TO THE RENAISSANCE 68-69 (1988) (discussing
Roman law applicable to children born to unmarried women). Most infants born to unwed
mothers were probably abandoned, and John Boswell estimates that between twenty and forty
percent of all Roman children were abandoned. Id. at 135. English common-law doctrine is
known for being particularly hard on illegitimate children. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG,
GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 197-200
(1985) (discussing American willingness to adopt the more moderate civil-law traditions
allowing legitimation). But even in England, illegitimate children were treated as the children
of their mothers, though their inheritance rights were severely limited. See WILFRID HOOPER,
THE LAW OF ILLEGITIMACY 25-27 (1911) (discussing various ways in which the law treated
an illegitimate child as the child of its mother).
20 Helmholz, supra note 17, at 435-36 (quoting a medieval canonist’s assertion that the
Church has a responsibility to nourish children).
21 Id. at 434.
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“father” was the man who had the sex with the woman that resulted in the
pregnancy that produced a child.22 Given the state of biological science in the
year 1234, it would have been hard for him to mean anything else. Ecclesiastical
courts enforced the Pope’s edict to the extent they could, but proving paternity
in a time when no one had come close to conceptualizing what genes were was
no doubt difficult.23 The trials could only be about who had sex with whom.
As ecclesiastical authority gave way to secular governments, different
European legal systems addressed nonmarital procreation in a variety of ways.
In seventeenth- and eighteenth-century France, married men could not be sued
in paternity, though unmarried men could be.24 The Napoleonic Code and Dutch
law eliminated all paternity actions in the nineteenth century.25 German law had
its own history.26 Paternity laws in Europe today continue to be less uniform and
less definitive than in Anglo-American countries; the genetic father’s financial
liability in those countries is usually significantly less than it is in the United
States, and the men are rarely awarded the full panoply of custodial rights that
accompany legal fatherhood in the United States.27
British law proceeded differently. The secular Anglo-American paternity suit
originated as part of the British Poor Law legislation of 1574.28 These suits were
brought by justices of the peace and were limited to actions against the genetic
fathers of children whose mothers were receiving support from the state.29 As
they are today, these suits were necessarily classed because they were designed
to alleviate a state’s welfare burden, though they also helped police sexual

22

Id.
The birth of modern genetic science is usually traced to Gregory Mandel, a late
nineteenth century Austrian monk. See History of Genetics, KENYON U. BIOLOGY DEP’T,
http://biology.kenyon.edu/courses/biol114/Chap01/history_genetics.html
[https://perma.cc/7Q77-CHP2] (last visited Sept. 16, 2016) (chronicling important steps in
human understanding of genetics).
24 JENNY TEICHMAN, ILLEGITIMACY: AN EXAMINATION OF BASTARDY 154-55 (1982) (“It
was possible for a mother to take out filiation proceedings against the putative father, but only
if he was unmarried.”).
25 J. E. Scholtens, Maintenance of Illegitimate Children and the Exceptio Plurium
Concubentium, 72 S. AFR. L.J. 144, 148-49 (1955).
26 TEICHMAN, supra note 24, at 55 (describing the tradition among German tribes to
impose paternity only if the alleged genetic father was of the same race and class).
27 See JAMES DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 32-33 (2006) (stating that,
in Denmark, genetic fathers are given some obligation to support, but not paternal rights,
while in the Netherlands and Germany, genetic fathers have limited custodial rights); W.
Craig Williams, The Paradox of Paternity Establishment: As Rights Go Up, Rates Go Down,
8 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 261, 261-81 (1977) (demonstrating how European law often
provides genetic fathers with fewer paternal rights than does United States law).
28 See TEICHMAN, supra note 24, at 61 (“[I]n . . . [1574] a statute was framed which
enabled justices to issue bastardy orders . . . whereby money could be obtained from the
putative fathers of bastards.”).
29 Lawrence P. Hampton, Common Law Status of the Child, in 1 DISPUTED PATERNITY
PROCEEDINGS § 1.02(1)-(3) (5th ed. 1996).
23
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morality.30 There was still no scientific basis for establishing genetic connection,
connection, so these suits were usually little more than “sordid spectacles” for
both parties.31
British law did not recognize a private right of action in paternity until 1844,
when mothers received the right to sue in paternity on behalf of their children.32
Only at that point did the law suggest that establishing legal fatherhood could
be about something other than refilling state coffers.
In the United States, different states expressed different theories of paternity
enforcement. For some, these suits were meant to provide resources for the
child, while for others, they were seen as punishment for extramarital sex.33 For
still others, they were punishment for mistreatment of the mother.34 In 1967, one
New Jersey court summarized the law of paternity as follows: “[f]iliation
statutes are generally considered to represent an exercise of the police power for
the primary purposes of denouncing the misconduct involved, punishing the
offender or shifting the burden of support from society to the child’s natural
parent.”35 The varied liability imposed reflected these differing views. Some
states imposed no obligation on unwed genetic fathers,36 while others mandated
fixed monthly amounts.37 A few states treated an unwed genetic father’s child
support duty as it treated a divorced father’s child support duty,38 though most
states vested judges with tremendous discretion in setting child support amounts
for anyone that might owe them. 39 Thus, treating unwed genetic fathers and
marital fathers equally meant little because there was no baseline of child
support from which courts operated.

30 See Scholtens, supra note 25, at 150-51 (finding judgments that included damages for
defloration as well as maintenance of the child).
31 HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 106 (1971) (stating that
paternity suits are usually “sordid spectacle[s]” for all parties involved).
32 Hampton, supra note 29, at § 1.02(3).
33 Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA. L.
REV. 649, 659 (2008) (describing the divergent theories shaping parental duty among the
states until “approximately forty years ago”). Determining guilt in these situations was
sometimes difficult because the woman was often seen as being at fault as well. If she led on
the man, then he was not necessarily guilty enough to be ordered to support the child.
34 KRAUSE, supra note 31, at 109 (“The criminal proceeding in which paternity is
determined may be a prosecution for the crime of bastardy or fornication.”).
35 State v. M., 233 A.2d 65, 67 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967).
36 See KRAUSE, supra note 31, at 22 (stating that Texas and Idaho did not grant illegitimate
children the right to support from their fathers).
37 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 742.041 (1951) (setting fixed monthly amounts for illegitimate
children that increases with the child’s age).
38 See Baker, supra note 33, at 659 (citing KRAUSE, supra note 31, at 23).
39 See Nancy Thoeness, Patricia Tjaden & Jessica Pearson, The Impact of Child Support
Guidelines on Award Adequacy, Award Variability, and Case Processing Efficiency, 25 FAM.
L.Q. 325, 326-27 (1991) (discussing variability in child support awards before the adoption
of guidelines and the development of child support guidelines to curtail judicial discretion).
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The state of paternity law looks somewhat more uniform today, in part
because of Supreme Court intervention and in part because of congressional
intervention. In a series of cases decided mostly in the 1970s, the Court
questioned the constitutionality of statutory distinctions between legitimate
(marital) and illegitimate (nonmarital) children.40 What emerged was a
confusing and at times inconsistent doctrine, but one that suggested that the
Equal Protection Clause required states to be careful in making distinctions
between marital and nonmarital children when granting entitlements.41 In some
contexts, the Court accepted the idea that administrative convenience justifies
making distinctions between marital and nonmarital children. For instance, the
Court consistently held that if a child had not established legal paternity before
his or her genetic father died, that child had no right to an estate or the social
welfare benefits to which the deceased’s marital children might be entitled.42
However, the Court simultaneously held that a nonmarital child has a
constitutional right to try to establish legal paternity based on genetics if his or
her father is alive.43 States interpreted these cases to require a DNA default for
all nonmarital children.
The Court retreated from the legitimacy cases rather hastily, possibly because
it realized that its decisions raised as many questions as they answered. Do the
constitutional rights to a DNA default apply to children who have marital
parents, just not parents to whom they are genetically related? Can children
choose which parent(s) they want?44 The Court often emphasized that

40

See generally Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461-65 (1988) (applying equal protection
principles to state paternity law); Mills v. Hablutzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99-102 (1982) (same); Lalli
v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 264-76 (1978) (same); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 535-38 (1973)
(per curiam) (same); see also Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 503-16 (1976) (applying equal
protection principles to Social Security provision dealing with nonmarital children).
41 See Katharine K. Baker, Legitimate Families and Equal Protection, 56 B.C. L. REV
1647, 1647-95 (2015) (explicating the legitimacy cases and suggesting that they are
exceedingly difficult to reconcile with each other and with contemporary family law,
particularly that pertaining to same-sex parenting and reproductive technologies).
42 Lalli, 439 U.S. at 275-76 (concluding that an illegitimate son cannot inherit from his
father under New York’s intestacy statute because he was never legally acknowledged by the
father); Mathews, 427 U.S. at 516 (holding that genetic children who were not living with
their genetic father when he died were not entitled to a presumption of dependency).
43 See Clark, 486 U.S. at 463 (holding that six years is an insufficiently short statute of
limitation for paternity actions); Mills, 456 U.S. at 99-100 (holding that a child must be given
adequate time to establish paternity, and that the one-year period established by Texas law is
“inadequate”); Gomez, 409 U.S. at 538 (concluding that Texas could not deny a nonmarital
child the right to collect child support when such rights are accorded to children generally).
44 If the child of an unwed mother has a constitutional right to sue his genetic father, why
shouldn’t the child of a wed mother who had an extramarital affair be entitled to the same
right to establish paternity in the genetic father who is not his legal father? If the marital father
has more money, can the child opt not to establish paternity in someone else? Is the choice
the child’s or the genetic father’s or the marital father’s or the mother’s? Why should it matter,
especially now, whether any of the potential fathers are dead? It is quite easy to establish
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nonmarital children were emotionally and financially dependent on their unwed
genetic fathers, just as marital children are dependent on their genetic fathers,
but of course, many children are emotionally and financially dependent on adults
to whom they have no genetic connection.45 Is it the functional dependence or
the genetic connection that gives rise to the constitutional right?46 And, for cases
the Court could not have foreseen in the 1970s and 1980s, what sort of rights to
establish paternity do the illegitimate children of single mothers by choice have?
Do children conceived with purchased ova have a right to sue their genetic
mother? What if such a child has two fathers? At their core, the legitimacy cases
are rooted in a heteronormative genetic parentage ideal that is at odds with more
modern understandings of parenting.47 Nonetheless the legitimacy cases led
states to develop a more comprehensive, genetically based paternity law that at
least tries to afford all nonmarital children the right to sue to establish paternity
in a genetic father and tries to afford genetic fathers the right to establish their
own paternity.48
genetic connection with a deceased person. See RALPH C. BRASHIER, INHERITANCE LAW AND
THE EVOLVING FAMILY 140-45 (2004) (discussing the ease of establishing a genetic
connection to a deceased person and the considerable havoc it is reaping in intestacy
proceedings).
45 Dorothy Roberts has observed that parents in African-American communities often
parent children to whom they are not biologically related. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic
Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 214 (1995).
46 In several cases the Court seemed eager to treat the children of nonmarital fathers as the
children of marital fathers because the nonmarital fathers had lived with, and cared for, their
nonmarital children just as marital fathers do, and the children had been dependent on them
before the fathers died or got hurt. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769 (1977).
But in Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. at 509, the Court got tangled up in its own focus on
functional dependence. In that case, the Court upheld a Social Security provision that barred
nonmarital children from collecting on a genetic father’s account if they were not dependent
on the father when he died. Id. at 516. The father in Mathews had lived with, but then
abandoned, his genetic children. Id. at 497. The Court was willing to treat the nonmarital
children worse than marital children because they were abandoned and, therefore, not
dependent on him, which seems like an odd way of protecting nonmarital children’s interests.
See id. at 514-16.
47 See Baker, supra note 41, at 1683-90 (discussing how elevating the importance of
genetic connection, which is how many people read the legitimacy cases, is at odds with
nonheteronormative parenting practices that “rely on other legal constructs rather than
biology”).
48 See Leslie Joan Harris, Reforming Paternity Law to Eliminate Gender, Status, and Class
Inequality, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1295, 1300-01 (discussing the judicial and legislative
regime change that conferred certain rights on nonmarital children and fathers). There is still
considerable variation in how much the marital status of the child’s mother matters to the
child’s and the alleged genetic father’s right to sue. A child whose mother was married to
someone other than her genetic father would have little opportunity to sue if the mother did
not want her to because the child would have no reason to know that a suit might be available.
Many states still make it difficult for an alleged father to sue to establish paternity if the child
already has a marital father. See id. at 1302 (describing the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act’s
statutory time limit on alleged father’s ability to bring suit).
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Congressional concern with the “problem” of illegitimate children centered
less on the plight of the children than on how much they cost. As the number of
nonmarital births continued to rise, Congress grew increasingly worried about
the amount of support that nonmarital children were receiving in the form of
federal welfare assistance.49 Despite the considerable federalist history of
leaving matters of family law to the states,50 Congress began to take an active
part in child support enforcement. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s,
congressional programs tried to effectuate more consistent enforcement of child
support orders for children receiving state aid.51 This required being able to
locate the adults whom the state could make financially responsible for the child.
Even with this congressional intervention, by 1989, the paternity establishment
rate for nonmarital children was only thirty-one percent.52 It became clear that
the problem was not just that child support orders were not enforced, but that
many mothers had little interest in establishing legal coparentage with someone
else,53 and many genetic fathers had little interest in establishing a legal parentchild relationship.
Congress took it upon itself to increase the rate of paternity establishment.
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, passed
in 1996,54 requires states to create a rebuttable legal presumption of paternity in
anyone who acknowledges paternity.55 Congress rewards states with high
paternity establishment rates56 and requires them to institute hospital-based
programs for voluntary acknowledgements of paternity.57 In practice, this means
that before any unwed mother leaves the hospital with a newborn child, a state
official has to try to secure from her and a man, if he is there, a signed affidavit

49

Id. at 1304 (“In 1975 Congress established the federal-state child-support enforcement
program in response to concerns about the growth in welfare rolls.”).
50 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691 (2013).
51 See Harris, supra note 48, at 1304 (citing Social Service Amendments of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-669 (2012))).
52 Id.
53 In one study, a distinct minority of the women who could have pursued the unwed father
in paternity chose not to do so. Esther Wattenberg, Paternity Actions and Young Fathers, in
YOUNG UNWED FATHERS: CHANGING ROLES AND EMERGING POLICIES 213, 227 (Robert I.
Lerman & Theodora J. Ooms eds., 1993) (finding that about one in four white unmarried
parents and only one in six black unmarried parents were engaged in court adjudication of
paternity).
54 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 8, 21, 25, and 42
U.S.C.).
55 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(B)-(C) (detailing state responsibilities to allow men to sign a VAP
and the presumption of legal paternity that must accompany that acknowledgement).
56 Jana Singer, Marriage, Biology, and Paternity: The Case for Revitalizing the Marital
Presumption, 65 MD. L. REV. 246, 252 (2005).
57 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C)(ii).
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averring that the man is the father of the child.58 The signed document, known
as a Voluntary Acknowledgement of Paternity (“VAP”), is recorded with the
vital records office and, if not rescinded within sixty days,59 becomes a final
legal judgment that can be challenged only on grounds of fraud, duress, or
material mistake of fact.60 Today, VAPs are the primary means of establishing
parentage in children born to unwed mothers.61 The federal statute does not
explicitly require that VAPs be based on genetics,62 but state regulations usually
explicitly or implicitly make them genetically conditional.63
A signed VAP makes the signatory a legal father based on his declaration that
he is the genetic father, though in most cases, without genetic testing, all the
man can know is whether he had the sex that might have produced the child.64
As the legal father, he is responsible for child support and he is automatically
entitled to visitation. As the legal father, he also has standing to try to demand
more comprehensive custody rights.65 In practice, many unwed genetic fathers
do not secure legal custody rights and usually only visit their children with the
mother’s permission. Because unwed genetic fathers have never entered into a
legal relationship with the mother, they never have to go to court to dissolve it,
meaning that a court does not have to be involved in the allocation of property
58

See id.
Id. § 666(a)(5)(D)(ii)(I).
60 Id. § 666(a)(5)(D)(iii).
61 In 2009, 1.81 million children were born to unwed mothers and 1.17 million children
had their parentage established by a VAP. FY2009 Annual Report to Congress, OFF. CHILD
SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT (Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/css/resource/fy2009-annualreport [https://perma.cc/7D8Q-XPT9].
62 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C) (failing to mention genetics or genetic testing as a necessary
part of acknowledging paternity).
63 Most state regulation forms ask a man to swear that he is the genetic father. See, e.g.,
Acknowledgement
of
Paternity
Affidavit,
http://www.healthandwelfare.idaho.gov/Portals/0/Health/Vital%20Records/PaternityAffida
vitE.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DJX-4M26] (last visited Sept. 23, 2016) (illustrating a sample
VAP
for
Idaho);
Voluntary
Acknowledgment
of
Parentage,
http://www.mass.gov/dor/docs/cse/parents/voluntary-ack-of-parentage-form.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4K4Y-H4Q7] (last visited Sept. 23, 2016) (illustrating a sample VAP for
Massachusetts). VAPs can be, though often are not, set aside even after the sixty-day period
if genetic testing reveals that the signatory is not the genetic father. See Leslie Joan Harris,
Voluntary Acknowledgements of Parentage for Same-Sex Couples, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 467, 480 (2012).
64 In most instances, without genetic testing, the mother is the only person who might
know for sure who the genetic father is, and she might well not even know. Yet both men and
women are routinely asked to aver to the truth of the genetic connection. The only question
the VAP can expect that parties to be able to answer truthfully is whether the two signatories
had sex that might have produced this child.
65 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3010(a) (Deering 2016) (stating that both mother and father
are equally entitled to custody); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.04 (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (stating that all legal parents have a
right to bring an action for custody).
59
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or custodial rights between the adults.66 Only if they are sued for child support,
either by the mother or the state (if the mother applied for welfare benefits on
behalf of the child) do these men usually make any claim for formal custodial
rights. Without such a claim, the adults work out whatever joint custodial time
they can agree to on their own.
Numerous contemporary commentators criticize this system as insufficiently
protective of genetic fathers’ rights.67 This Article takes an entirely different,
almost opposite, approach. It asks why the law should designate unwed genetic
fathers as legal fathers at all. If the state were not so worried about privatizing
dependencies, would the law be so concerned with finding two parents for every
born child? Why should the law stop at two? Even if there is consensus that a
child should have two parents, should the law use genetics to determine
parentage?
II.

THE DNA DEFAULT IN THEORY

This Part explores what a genetic regime treats as critical for determining
parenthood (sex) and what it treats as relatively unimportant (reproductive
labor). It suggests that both men who do not want to be parents and women who
want to parent alone are hurt by the law’s conflation of genetic and legal
parenthood. This Part also examines whether highlighting genetic connection in
parenthood serves children’s interests, finding that there is little evidence that it
does so.
A.

The Sex Police

Imagine a contract between two unmarried adults, Beth and Bob. Bob
promises to deliver to Beth a vial of his sperm, and both Bob and Beth mutually
agree that Bob will not be a legal parent of any child born. This contract, express
or implied, signed or oral, is enforceable under the 2002 Uniform Parentage Act
(“UPA”) and in all states.68 There is no DNA default for children born with

66

See Huntington, supra note 9, at 209-10 (discussing how unmarried couples do not
necessarily have to go to court when they separate). Divorcing parents necessarily go to court
to end their marriage and, if there are children of the marriage, a court must issue a ruling
defining the custodial rights of the divorcing parents. See id. at 171 (“[B]ecause only the state
can dissolve a marriage, marital family law presumes that couples will go to court at the end
of relationships. . . . [And] [t]he court system is designed to establish co-parenting structures
for a couple’s postdivorce family life.”).
67 See infra notes 188-94 and accompanying text (discussing the status quo in which
mothers have primary custody, and noting the lack of legal protection for unwed fathers).
68 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS OF UNIF. STATE LAWS
2002). Some states still require a doctor to perform the artificial insemination in order for the
state parentage acts pertaining to assisted reproduction to apply. See Susan Frelich Appleton,
Between the Binaries: Exploring the Legal Boundaries of Nonanonymous Sperm Donation,
49 FAM. L.Q. 93, 109 (2015). Other states may override the contract if the parties function as
parents after birth, even though they agreed not to be parents before birth. See id. at 102-04.
But, all states allow contracts to govern the parentage of a child born pursuant to a clinical
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purchased or donated gametes.69 Yet, if Beth and Bob’s contract was the same
in all respects except the delivery of sperm—if the sperm were delivered
coitally—the contract would be unenforceable everywhere.70 Indeed, actions in
paternity can proceed even if the sex was procured through fraud71 or under
conditions that constitute statutory rape.72 Sex is a strict liability offense for men.
men.
The DNA default polices sex by treating the parentage of children conceived
through sex differently than the parentage of children conceived through other
means. It makes all other questions that might be relevant to whether parental
status should be assigned, like intent to parent, ability to parent, and willingness
to coparent, irrelevant if the child was produced coitally. Given the robust
constitutional protection of sexual activity,73 this penalty associated with sex is
striking. It is as if the state imposes a fine—twenty percent of one’s income for
eighteen years—for having sex with an unmarried woman.74
nonsexual insemination.
69 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, supra note 68, § 702 (“A donor is not a parent of a child
conceived by means of assisted reproduction.”).
70 See, e.g., Budnick v. Silverman, 805 So. 2d 1112, 1113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)
(finding a preconception contract, which agreed not to identify the genetic father in paternity,
unenforceable because the “rights of support and meaningful relationship belong to the child,
not the parent; therefore, neither parent can bargain away those rights”); Moorman v. Walker,
773 P.2d 887, 889 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (“[T]he moral responsibility for creating a human
life is not voidable as if sex were a simple contractual transaction.”). Sperm donors who leave
their sperm at a sperm bank routinely bargain away those rights, often for as little as seventyfive dollars per donation. Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Financial
Compensation of Oocyte Donors, 88 FERTILITY & STERILITY 305, 306 (2007).
71 E.g., Dubay v. Wells, 506 F.3d 422, 426 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating that a woman lying
about birth control does not constitute a defense to paternity); Wallis v. Smith, 22 P.3d 682,
685-86 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the genetic father cannot assert actions for fraud,
breach of contract, or tort to recoup the financial obligations of raising his unwanted child
despite girlfriend’s misrepresentation about birth control); Pamela P. v. Frank S., 449 N.E.2d
713, 715 (N.Y. 1983) (explaining that considerations of the mother’s “‘fault’ or wrongful
conduct” is irrelevant to questions of whether genetic father can be held responsible for child
support).
72 Males who may have had a valid statutory rape claim could still be found responsible in
paternity for child support. See, e.g., Cty. of San Luis Obispo v. Nathaniel J., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d
843, 844 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Mercer Cty. Dept. of Soc. Serv. v. Alf M., 589 N.Y.S.2d 288,
289 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1992) (finding underage men responsible for child support); In re
Paternity of K.B., 104 P.3d 1132, 1135 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004).
73 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). One might argue that the DNA default
does not penalize sex; it only forces men to accept its consequences. But for men, who have
no say in the decision to terminate a pregnancy, no defense to having been lied to about the
possibility of consequences, and no legal right to contract around those consequences, the
DNA default operates much like a penalty.
74 The percentage of one’s income that one owes in child support can depend somewhat
on what the other parent earns, how many children one is responsible for, and if there are
special needs; however, twenty percent of income is a good approximation of what a
noncustodial parent is likely to owe for one child. See Katharine K. Baker, Homogenous Rules
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The legitimacy cases, which initially gave rise to the increased use of the
DNA default, were fueled by a belief that the legitimacy label and the marital
presumption of paternity were moralistic devices, designed to punish
extramarital sex by labeling nonmarital children “illegitimate.”75 But, the DNA
default is just as, if not more, moralistic than the marital presumption. Marriage
assigns parentage based on a valid agreement between two adults to enter into a
legal relationship requiring the sharing of many things, including parentage.76
The DNA default assigns parentage based on the fact that two people had sex,
and if the sex produced a child, there is no defense to parentage.
The UPA, adopted by many states and used as a set of guiding principles for
courts in other states, makes an absolute but unexplained distinction between
children produced sexually and children produced nonsexually.77 The first six
articles of the UPA treat genetic connection as the sine qua non of parenthood,78
and suggest that science can solve all problems stemming from competing
presumptions of parentage.79 It was in following the UPA’s lead that most states
included an averment of genetic connection on the VAP form,80 and UPA
comments suggest it is just a matter of time before states eliminate rules that

for Heterogeneous Families: The Standardization of Family Law When There Is No Standard
Family, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 319, 328-31 (explaining the origins and codification of child
support formulae and the reasons why, though states use different methodologies for
calculating obligations, they rely on the same underlying data and therefore reach very
comparable results).
75 Indeed, states trying to maintain their right to treat marital and nonmarital children
differently originally defended the legitimacy distinction on those moralistic grounds. See
Glona v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75 (1968) (dismissing state claims
that legitimacy classifications helped discourage nonmarital sex); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
68, 70 (1968).
76 In all states in the United States, money earned during a marriage is considered joint
property, subject to equitable division between the spouses if they get divorced. See Baker,
supra note 74, at 333-35.
77 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, supra note 68, § 701 cmt. (“Article 7 applies only to children
born as the result of assisted reproduction technologies; a child conceived by sexual
intercourse is not covered by this article . . . .”).
78 See id. § 201(a)(1) (stating the mother-child relationship is established by “the woman’s
having given birth to the child”). The UPA does include one section that allows equitable
principles to trump genetic connection if a paternal presumption is being challenged. Id. §
608(a)(2) (stating the court may deny a motion to seek an order for genetic testing if “it would
be inequitable to disprove the father-child relationship between the child and the presumed or
acknowledged father”). But this provision seems at odds with other provisions of the Act. See
infra notes 79-81.
79 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, supra note 68, § 204 cmt. at 15 (“[T]he existence of modern
genetic testing obviates [the] old approach to the problem of conflicting presumptions when
a court is to determine paternity. Nowadays, genetic testing makes it possible in most cases
to resolve competing claims to paternity.”).
80 Id. § 301 cmt.
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limit the extent to which the marital presumption of paternity can be questioned
by genetic fathers.81
Articles 7 and 8 of the UPA, which “[do] not apply to the birth of a child
conceived by means of sexual intercourse,”82 treat parentage wholly differently.
Parentage for children conceived nonsexually is assigned based on intent,
consent, and suitability of the parties for parenting.83 One might expect some
explanation for why the means of conception requires an entirely different set
of rules to determine parentage, but the UPA does not provide any. Interestingly,
Article 7 contemplates numerous instances in which the conceived child would
have only one parent: when an unmarried woman uses donor sperm,84 when a
husband does not consent to his wife’s post-divorce artificial insemination,85 or
in a situation in which a husband’s original consent to artificial insemination has
been voided by divorce or formally withdrawn.86 “In th[ese] instance[s],
intention, rather than biology, is the controlling factor.”87 The fiscal concerns
81

See id. § 607 cmt. at 47 (“Not that long ago, some states imposed an absolute bar on a
man commencing a proceeding to establish his paternity if state law provides a statutory
presumption of the paternity of another man. It is increasingly clear that those days are coming
to an end.” (citing Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989))). This comment misstates
the law as it applied in Michael H. The California statute allowed the putative father to try to
establish his paternity if he had the consent of the mother. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 116
(“The presumption may be rebutted by blood tests, but only if a motion for such tests is
made . . . either by the husband or, if the natural father has filed an affidavit acknowledging
paternity, by the wife.”).
82 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, supra note 68, § 701. The UPA treats children born of what it
calls “assisted reproduction,” id. art. 7, somewhat differently than children born pursuant to
“gestational agreement,” id. art. 8. The Act imposes more formalities on contracts for
gestational services than on contracts for gametes. Given the extraordinary importance the
Act puts on gametes in its first six articles, this somewhat cavalier treatment of them in Article
7 might have given the drafters pause. Nonetheless, both Articles 7 and 8 determine parentage
primarily with reference to the intent and consent of the potential parties. See, e.g., id. § 703
(“A man who provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted reproduction by a woman as
provided in Section 704 with the intent to be the parent of her child, is a parent of the resulting
child.”); id. § 801(b) (“The man and the woman who are the intended parents must both be
parties to the gestational agreement.”).
83 See id. § 703 cmt. (declaring the donor is a parent if he “provide[d] sperm . . . with the
intent to be the parent of her child”); id. § 704(a) (“Consent by a woman, and a man who
intends to be a parent of a child born to the woman by assisted reproduction must be in a
record signed by the woman and the man.”); id. § 802 cmt. (“The purpose of early
involvement is to ensure that the parties are appropriate for a gestational agreement, that they
understand the consequences of what they are about to do, and that the best interests of a child
born of the gestational agreement are considered before the arrangement is validated.”).
Another comment simultaneously acknowledges that for children conceived through sexual
intercourse, parentage is established “irrespective of the alleged intent of the parties.” See id.
§ 701 cmt.
84 See id. § 702 cmt.
85 See id. § 706 cmt. at 66.
86 See id. § 706 cmt. at 67.
87 Id.
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that first gave rise to the DNA default, with its insistence on two potential
sources of support, disappear if a child is conceived nonsexually.
The UPA’s unaddressed but stark distinction between sexual and nonsexual
reproduction is reflected in the case law. Preconception intent almost always
governs the parentage question for children conceived noncoitally, but never
governs for children conceived through intercourse.88 Ferguson v. McKiernan89
lays out the issue nicely, stating that there is a “common-sense distinction
between reproduction via sexual intercourse and the non-sexual clinical options
for conception.”90 The mother in Ferguson entered into an oral agreement with
her former sexual partner where he would donate sperm for her use for in vitro
fertilization.91 She had previously undergone tubal ligation surgery and could
not conceive sexually, and she promised not to sue him in paternity.92 She gave
birth to twins, and when the twins were five-years-old, she sued him for child
support.93 By that time, he had married someone else with whom he had a child
in the marriage.94
The trial, appellate, and supreme courts of Pennsylvania all found the
agreement not to establish paternity valid as a contract, but relying on case law
involving sexually produced children, the lower courts found the contract
unenforceable as it was against public policy.95 The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania reversed:
[T]wo potential cases at the extremes of an increasingly complicated
continuum present themselves: dissolution of a relationship (or a mere
sexual encounter) that produces a child via intercourse, which requires both
parents to provide support; and an anonymous sperm donation, absent sex,
resulting in the birth of a child. These opposed extremes produce two
distinct views that we believe to be self-evident. In the case of traditional
sexual reproduction, there simply is no question that the parties to any
resultant conception and birth may not contract between themselves to
deny the child the support he or she requires. . . . In the institutional sperm
donation case, however, there appears to be a growing consensus that

88

See In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 35 (Colo. 1989) (reviewing commentary and case law and
concluding preconception intent is appropriate standard for nonsexual conception); Katherine
K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology? The History and Future of Paternity Law and Parental
Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 28-30 (2004) (summarizing the intent standard as
used in courts in cases involving nonsexual reproduction); see also Susan Frelich Appleton,
Exploring the Legal Boundaries of Nonanonymous Sperm Donation, 48 FAM. L.Q. 93, 94
(2015) (describing the binary sexually produced and nonsexually produced children).
89 940 A.2d 1236 (Pa. 2007).
90 Id. at 1245 (emphasis added).
91 Id. at 1239.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 1240.
94 Id. at 1241.
95 Id. at 1238.

2016]

THE DNA DEFAULT AND ITS DISCONTENTS

2055

clinical, institutional sperm donation neither imposes obligations nor
confers privileges upon the sperm donor.96
The court did not explain the “self-evident” and “common-sense” distinction
between sexually and nonsexually produced children any more than the UPA
does, but it did use an intent standard to determine parenthood and find the
contract enforceable.97
The way the court reached its result is as telling as its ultimate holding. First,
like both lower courts, the highest court found it necessary to describe the
parties’ previous sexual relationship, even though that previous sexual
relationship was irrelevant to how the twins were conceived.98 Had the parties
not had a previous sexual relationship, there would have been no question as to
the contract’s enforceability. Why did the past sexual relationship matter? It
seems likely that the judges were just too unnerved by the recognition that if the
sex between these parties had produced a child, no contract, or fraud, or mistake,
would have eliminated the sexual partner’s responsibility to parent. In fact, the
mother in this case had lied to her sexual partner repeatedly about whether she
was using birth control; the court found her “inexplicably” duplicitous in dealing
with him,99 but none of those lies would have mattered if she had subsequently
sued him to establish the paternity of a sexually conceived child.100
Second, the court well understood that to find paternity in this instance would
put at risk the reproductive choices of “[a]n increasing number of would-be
mothers who find themselves either unable or unwilling to conceive and raise
children in the context of marriage [who] are turning to donor arrangements.”101
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania imposed single motherhood on the plaintiff
in this case because it was concerned about all the other recipients of sperm who
were single mothers by choice.102 This policy judgment is wholly consistent with
with a parentage regime based on intent, but not at all consistent with a regime
that is so concerned with privatizing dependency that it holds men strictly liable
for sexually produced children.
Finally, the court in Ferguson noted that true solicitude for children’s interests
requires taking into account the defendant sperm donor’s marital child, “who . . .
did not ask to be born into this situation, but whose interests would suffer,” if
the contract were not enforced.103 Understanding that adults often have other
children who will be impacted by findings of parentage seems like a
96

Id. at 1246 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1248.
98 Id. at 1239-40.
99 Id. at 1239.
100 See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing that wrongful conduct of the
mother is irrelevant to whether a genetic father can be held responsible for child support of a
sexually conceived child).
101 Ferguson, 940 A.2d at 1245.
102 Id. at 1247.
103 Id. at 1248.
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straightforward proposition. One’s ability to provide, emotionally and
materially, for any one child depends in part on how many other children one
has. Yet, the recognition that assigning parentage to a particular adult for the
benefit of one child may well have a negative impact on other children whom
that adult parents is a concern that the Supreme Court and all courts determining
the parentage of sexually produced children regularly ignore.104
When a child is not produced sexually, courts contemplate different kinds of
equities, including those involving sperm donors who were lied to, those
involving women who may not want a coparent, and those involving existing
children who may be harmed by an assignment of paternity. The most important
factor in determining parenthood is usually the intent of the adults with regard
to parenthood. In other words, something like a contract (albeit with a healthy
dose of equitable review) governs. Intent and the other factors that seem so
obviously important when a child is conceived nonsexually lose all significance
when a child is produced sexually because, apparently, it is so self-evident that
the law should regulate sex.
B.

Women’s Reproductive Labor

Relying on the DNA default to determine legal parentage for children born as
a result of sex also erases the legal importance of women’s reproductive labor.
Men and women who have sex that results in a child are, at the child’s birth,
similarly situated with regard to their genetic connection to the child, but usually
not with regard to any other kind of investment, sacrifice, or decision-making
about that child’s existence. Common parlance tends to refer to genetic fathers
as “biological fathers,”105 but as every biologist knows, human genetic
progenitors, like all mammalian genetic progenitors, have very different
biological relationships to their children at birth.
As a biological matter, genetic mothers who conceive through intercourse
have invested more in their genetic issue at birth than have genetic fathers for
two reasons. First, the female gamete is much bigger than the male gamete, and
women use many more resources to produce one egg than men use to produce
one sperm. Second, the female gamete provides the food reserves that the
fertilized egg initially needs to grow.106 Those food reserves are just as essential
104 In several of the Supreme Court’s legitimacy cases, the Court spoke as if it was coming
to the defense of all children, but it was more often just forcing existing marital children to
share whatever estate or government benefits were at issue. See Baker, supra note 41, at 1663
(explaining how in “protecting” the rights of illegitimate children to benefits, a statute or court
is often forcing legitimate children to share more than they otherwise would have to).
105 Biological
Father,
COLLINS
ENG.
DICTIONARY,
http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/biological-father
[https://perma.cc/5BHP-XK8P] (last visited Sept. 23, 2016) (defining “biological father” as a
genetic father); see also Biological Parent, RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/biological-parent
[https://perma.cc/UST7-7PQ8]
(last visited Sept. 23, 2016) (defining “biological parent” as a genetic parent).
106 RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 141-42 (1976).
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to the reproduction process as is the genetic parents’ DNA, but the female
gamete, and only the female gamete, has those food reserves.107 Thus, even
though any child shares equal amounts of genetic material from both male and
female parents, the gamete containing the mother’s genetic material is far more
resource intensive and more precious than the male gamete.
Because of the work it takes to produce each egg, women cannot produce as
many eggs as men do sperm. Sperm and egg are thought of as comparable
investments because they have comparable genetic allotments, but markets
reflect a very gendered difference between female and male gametes. The
American Society for Reproductive Medicine suggests that $5000 is an
appropriate price to pay for several eggs, while men get paid between sixty and
seventy-five dollars for many more sperm.108 Modern science and modern
markets make clear that sperm and eggs are different in important ways—ways
that suggest that in providing her gamete, a female is providing much more to
the fertilization process than is the male.
Even more important, the work that goes into making a fertilized egg into a
human being is exclusively female and—unless she chooses to terminate the
pregnancy—mandatory for the birth mother.109 Carrying a pregnancy to term is
work. It is physical, often exhausting work,110 and it is emotional work that can
be debilitating or exhilarating, or both.111 It is work that comes with an extensive
list of medical treatments, recommendations, and restrictions on one’s activities.
It is work that fathers never do.112 This means at birth, pursuant to almost any

107

See D.L. Dufour & M.L. Sauther, Comparative and Evolutionary Dimensions of the
Energetics of Human Pregnancy and Lactation, 14 AM. J. HUM. BIOLOGY 584, 585-86 (2002).
108 Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 70, at 308. Many women
get compensated above the $5000 mark as well. See Brooke Edwards, The High Cost of
Giving
Up
Your
Eggs,
NYU
LIVEWIRE
(Apr.
30,
2007),
http://journalism.nyu.edu/publishing/archives/livewire/archived/high_cost_eggs/
[https://perma.cc/9JCF-JTL8] (suggesting that the going rate for egg donation in New York
City was $8000 and in California certain egg donors got paid as much as $25,000).
109 See Owen D. Jones, Sex, Culture and the Biology of Rape: Toward Explanation and
Prevention, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 827, 849-50 (1999) (explaining the differences between male
and female minimum parental investment).
110 See, e.g., Vern L. Katz, Prenatal Care, in DANFORTH’S OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY
1, 1-21 (Ronald S. Gibbs et al. eds., 10th ed. 2008); Kristen J. Lund & James McManaman,
Normal Labor, Delivery, Newborn Care, and Puerperium, in DANFORTH’S OBSTETRICS AND
GYNECOLOGY, supra, at 22, 22-34; Deborah Krakow, Medical and Surgical Complications of
Pregnancy, in DANFORTH’S OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY, supra, at 276, 276-310.
111 See generally LOUIS E. GENEVIE & EVA MARGOLIES, THE MOTHERHOOD REPORT: HOW
WOMEN FEEL ABOUT BEING MOTHERS 100-09 (1987) (summarizing survey results regarding
women’s feelings on pregnancy); Mary E. Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and
Child Custody, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 133, 142-52 (1992) (discussing women’s
feelings regarding “the emotional meaning of mothering”).
112 Becker, supra note 111, at 142.
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metric except a genetic one, a woman who gestated a child has invested much
more in the child than has a genetic father.113
This description of women’s reproductive contributions may invite critiques
of gender essentialism, maternalism, and disregard for the importance of
degendered parenting. Admittedly, there is a long history of using biological
differences between men and women as an excuse for discriminatory treatment
of women.114 But to assume, as the DNA default encourages us to, that genetic
contribution constitutes the essence of parentage is to ignore all of the
nongenetic work of reproducing, and the assumption does not even capture the
qualitatively different male and female gamete investment.115 If a gender
equality imperative compels the law to treat genetic mothers and fathers as
similarly situated at birth,116 then women’s reproductive labor is reduced—
legally—to a labor of love, which is how the law has always justified not
compensating for the work that women do.117 Ignoring and discounting the
“female” work that women have traditionally done has played just as important
a role in institutionalizing gender discrimination, as has highlighting women’s
biological differences.118
At times, the Supreme Court has recognized and rewarded women’s
disproportionate reproductive investment in children. In two abortion decisions,

113

If a genetic father has been solely responsible for a pregnant woman’s food, shelter,
protection, and medical care than he probably has a claim to comparable investment. Today,
more than any time in history, though, pregnant women are especially unlikely to be so
dependent on the genetic father of their children. Most women, particularly nonwealthy
women, provide as much if not more for their own and their developing fetuses as to their
sexual partners. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
114 See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422-23 (1908) (upholding different treatment of
men and women because “[t]he two sexes differ in structure of body, in the functions to be
performed by each, in the amount of physical strength, . . . and in the capacity to maintain the
struggle for subsistence”).
115 Of note here is how much data supports the notion that, particularly in the low-income
communities in which the DNA default is most applicable, women start changing their
behavior “overnight” when they learn they are pregnant, while men who find out that their
girlfriends are pregnant almost never change their behavior that quickly. See infra notes 21415 and accompanying text.
116 See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 250 (1983); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 646
(1972).
117 See Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 NW. U.
L. REV. 1, 36-54 (1996) (exploring the numerous ways in which courts and governmental
programs routinely treat women’s domestic labor as freely given or an act love, not work for
which they might be entitled to compensation).
118 Id. at 6 (“[T]he legal treatment of women’s unpaid labor disadvantages women.”); see
also Mary E. Becker, Obscuring the Struggle: Sex Discrimination, Social Security, and Stone,
Seidman, Sunstein and Tushnet’s Constitutional Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 264, 267-69 (1989)
(detailing how traditional treatment of women’s inequality fails to address how women’s
work is routinely ignored as work); Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571,
1589-1605 (1996) (explaining how the failure to tax housework bars women from the kind of
wage protections that men enjoy).
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the Court focused on the biological differences between men and women during
gestation to vest the right to terminate a pregnancy in the gestational mother, not
in both genetic progenitors of the fetus. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,119 the Court wrote: “[i]t is an inescapable biological fact
that state regulation with respect to the child a woman is carrying will have a far
greater impact on the mother’s liberty than on the father’s.”120 In Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,121 the Court found that the mother
must have the right over the genetic father to determine the course of the
pregnancy because she is “more directly and immediately” affected by it.122
In the unwed father cases, decided in the 1970s and 1980s, the Court
addressed whether a genetic connection to a child gave an unwed father
constitutional rights to fatherhood. The men in most of these cases argued both
that (1) their genetic connection gave them a right to some process before the
state summarily vested paternity in someone else, and (2) they had the right to
be treated as the genetic mothers of the children were treated as a matter of sex
equality doctrine. The court resolved both claims in a comparable manner. The
weight of both rights is dependent on the extent of the genetic father’s
relationship with the child.123 As a due process matter, the more established a
genetic father’s relationship with a child, the weightier his interest.124 As an

119

505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Id. at 896.
121 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
122 Id. at 71 (“The obvious fact is that when the wife and the husband disagree on this
decision, the view of only one of the two marriage partners can prevail [and] [i]nasmuch as it
is the woman who physically bears the child and who is the more directly and immediately
affected by the pregnancy, as between the two, the balance weighs in her favor.”).
123 Thus, while the legitimacy cases suggest that a child of an unwed mother has a
constitutional right to establish a legal parent-child relationship to his genetic father, a genetic
father does not necessarily have a reciprocal right to establish a legal parent-child relationship
to his genetic offspring. For instance, a genetic connection per se, gives a man no
constitutional paternal rights if the mother is married to someone else because the law can
vest fatherhood in the husband of the mother. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,
129-30 (1989). If the mother is unmarried, the genetic father has some process rights although
they are not particularly robust. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983). In Lehr,
the Court sanctioned the use of a putative father registry, which gave every man who thought
he might be genetically related to a child the ability to register with the state so that if the state
took action with regard to that child, the state would notify the putative father. Lehr, 463 U.S.
at 248-52. The Court found that Lehr’s failure to register in the state’s unwed father registry
voided any right he might have had to block the adoption of his genetic child by another man.
Id. at 264-65. Lehr had no relationship with the two-year-old child when he tried to block the
adoption. Id.
124 Compare Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972), in which the Court found that
the state had to provide the unwed genetic father of three children with whom he had lived all
their lives with the right to a hearing before the state could assume wardship over the children,
with Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978), in which the Court found that the unwed
father who had had no contact with his nonmarital child did not have the right to veto the
adoption of that child by another man.
120
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equality matter, the more established the relationship with the child, the more he
is similarly situated to the mother.125 The relationship, not genetic connection,
gives rise to constitutional rights for fathers.126 At birth, a genetic father has no
relationship with the child. The Court has also used biological differences
between men and women during gestation and at birth to condone the automatic
conferral of citizenship on the genetic children of American mothers, but not
necessarily the genetic children of American fathers.127
Many scholars have criticized the unwed father and citizenship cases as
rooted in gender stereotypes and maternalism.128 Far fewer scholars criticize the
abortion decisions on gender equality grounds; but if equality norms should be
used to override women’s much greater biological investment in a newborn
child, then it is not altogether clear why equality norms should not be used to
give genetic progenitors equal rights to a child before it is born. Stated
differently, why should a woman’s disproportionate investment in a newborn

125 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 267-68 (“Whereas [the mother] had a continuous custodial
responsibility for Jessica, [the father] never established any custodial, personal, or financial
relationship with her.”). The dissimilarity of situation stems from the relationship the mother
develops with a child in utero. As the born child matures, and the father develops his own
relationship with the child, the mother and the father become similarly situated for sex
equality
purposes.
See
Caban
v.
Mohammed,
441
U.S.
380,
394
(1979) (finding that an unwed father who had a relationship with his children was similarly
situated to the mother).
126 The Court has never resolved whether a genetic father has a right to a particular kind
of hearing. The strength of his constitutional rights depends on whether the hearing is
something like a fitness hearing, in which genetics would entitle him to the status of father
unless the state could prove him, by clear and convincing evidence, unfit, see Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768-69 (1982), or a “Best Interest of the Child” hearing, in which a
judge would be choosing between possible fathers based only on what the judge thought
would be in the child’s best interest. For a discussion of how courts approach these issues,
see Deborah H. Wald, The Parentage Puzzle: The Interplay Between Genetics, Procreative
Intent, and Parental Conduct in Determining Legal Parentage, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 379, 399-405 (2007).
127 See Flores-Villar v. United States, 564 U.S. 210, 210 (2011) (affirming the statutory
rule that vests citizenship in children whose genetic mother is a U.S. citizen, but not
necessarily in foreign-born children whose genetic father is an citizen), aff’g mem. by an
equally divided court, 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008); Nguyen v. INS 533 U.S. 53, 58-60
(2001); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 424 (1998).
128 For an example of criticism of the unwed father cases, see Melanie B. Jacobs, My Two
Dads: Disaggregating Social and Biological Paternity, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 809, 830-37 (2006)
(arguing against exclusive parenthood and for recognition of biological and legal fathers). For
examples of criticism of the citizenship cases, see Kerry Abrams & R. Kent Piacenti,
Immigration’s Family Values, 100 VA. L. REV. 629, 705-06 (2014) (stating that citizenship
cases rely on a “rigid notion of biological sex and outdated and stereotypical conceptions of
fathering”); Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and the Legal
Construction of Family, Race, and Nation, 123 YALE L.J. 2134, 2205 (2014) (arguing that
treatment of foreign-born children in citizenship law was shaped by “maternalist norms”
regarding mother and father relationships with nonmarital children).
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child become immediately irrelevant at birth when that disproportionate
investment is so obviously relevant to the abortion decision?129
In sum, when it comes to parental rights, not child support, the Supreme Court
has endorsed a vision of legal parenthood as rooted in something more than just
genetics. This explains why women have the exclusive right to make the
abortion decision and why, despite the fact that a fetus shares an equal genetic
connection with both genetic mother and father, the Court has been comfortable
vesting the birth mother with greater rights at birth.
The DNA default and Congress’s attempt to privatize all children’s
dependencies by imposing parenthood on all genetic parents ignores the
privileged position that the Supreme Court has allowed birth mothers to enjoy.
Women who apply for state aid are compelled to name a genetic father.130
Unmarried women who give birth in a hospital are visited by state agents, who
ask them to name the genetic fathers.131 There are plenty of instances of women
misidentifying the genetic father, either purposefully or accidentally,132 but no
state agent tells the new mother she has the right to not name anyone as the
father,133 unless the mother tells the state agent that she used a sperm donor; then
the state agent goes away.134 Just as genetic fathers can be free of child support
burdens if a child with their sperm is produced nonsexually, so a woman is free

129

Those who might argue that the law can afford the genetic father rights once the child
is born without impacting the mother may not understand how the law of parenthood works.
A woman who does not want to be a mother is not free to relinquish her parental rights if the
legal father does not let her. Just as a mother can sue a man in paternity even if he does not
want to be a parent, so to a man can assume custody of child and force the birth mother to
retain her legal status as mother. For a discussion, see Katharine K. Baker, Property Rules
Meet Feminist Needs: Respecting Autonomy by Valuing Connection, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1523,
1565-68 (1998).
130 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-669 (2012) (outlining procedures pursuant to which states can
recoup funds from any noncustodial parent by a custodial parent applying for aid).
131 See id. § 666(a)(5)(C)(ii) (requiring hospital-based programs to establish paternity).
132 See Harris, supra note 48, at 1330-35 (discussing cases of VAPs in which a man
acknowledged genetic paternity when, in fact, he was not the genetic father).
133 Id.
134 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C)(i)-(iii), (D)(ii); supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text; see
also Harris, supra note 48, at 1340 (noting that states give child support exceptions for
insemination situations); Singer, supra note 56, at 266-67 (explaining that “a substantial
number of states have enacted statutes providing that a sperm donor is not the legal father”).
I have first-hand knowledge of this process. A state social worker approached me in the
hospital after the birth of my first child. She already knew that I was unmarried (presumably
because of a box I checked when I was admitted the hospital) and she informed me that I had
to name the child’s father. I had been teaching family law for eight years at that point and was
confident that I was more familiar with both Illinois and constitutional law than was she. But,
when I challenged her on whether I had to fill out the form, she said I had to in order to protect
my child. I then engaged her in a discussion of sperm banks and she acknowledged that in
that situation I would not have to name a father. She could not explain why.
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to parent alone if her child is produced nonsexually.135 Neither freedom is
afforded to men and women who produced a child by having sex.
C.

Children’s Interest in the DNA Default

Given family law’s general interest in protecting the best interests of children,
one might think that the DNA default is rooted in solicitude for children. Some
lawmakers probably assume that children have a strong interest in being raised
by their genetic parents. Neither history nor contemporary data strongly supports
this assumption. Up through the eighteenth century, genetic parents of all but
the wealthiest classes routinely fostered their genetic children out and took other
children in.136 Family status was based on with whom one lived rather than to
whom one was genetically related.137 In his study of the family, John Gillis notes
that it was not until the twentieth century that mothers were assumed to be
responsible for all of their genetic issue.138 Only then did middle class families
develop an expectation of living with and guiding all of their genetic children
through their teenage years.139 Abandonment of one’s genetic issue did not
become morally suspect until the mid-nineteenth century, when, as Signe
Howell writes, genetics “was made the locus for moral responsibility” for
children.140
It is worth remembering how recent our attachment to genetics is because, as
Clifford Geertz reminds us, the ways in which people are defined “are not given
in the nature of things—they are historically constructed, socially maintained,
and individually applied.”141 The DNA default grew out of a desire to take
responsibility for children away from the collective and place it on individual
adults.142 It thus enabled a “characterization of humans as autonomous
individual beings,”143 such that genetics are seen as much more essential to who
135

See Baker, supra note 129, at 1545-46.
JOHN R. GILLIS, A WORLD OF THEIR OWN MAKING: MYTH, RITUAL, AND THE QUEST FOR
FAMILY VALUES 153-55 (1996) (describing how prior to the twentieth century, children often
did not live with their genetic parents due to high fertility rates, high prevalence of wet
nursing, comparatively short maternal life spans, as well as other factors and suggesting, as a
result, motherhood and maternity did not converge until children lived with their biological
mothers).
137 See id. at 155-56 (“Only in this century has maternity come to bear all the weight of
the symbolic as well as practical meanings that were once attached to all who mothered rather
than to the one particular person who gave birth.”).
138 Id. at 154-55.
139 Id.
140 Signe Howell, Changes in Moral Values About the Family: Adoption Legislation in
Norway and the US, 50 SOC. ANALYSIS 146, 150-51 (2006).
141 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 363-64 (1973).
142 See GILLIS, supra note 136, at 155 (“This change followed the general shift in thinking
of parenting as an individual rather than a collective responsibility, one best carried out by
one set of parents rather than several.”).
143 Howell, supra note 140, at 150.
136
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we are than are our “sociality and kinship” networks.144 This existential
autonomy is not universal. Many other “societies perceive the person in terms
of group identification.”145 Dorothy Roberts has suggested that AfricanAmericans in this country have long perceived their own identity in less genetic
and more social terms.146
The idea that children’s interests are best protected when they are raised by
their genetic parents was recently dismissed by all of the federal appellate courts
that found a constitutional right to same-sex marriage, none of which found
merit in the argument that states need to protect children’s interest in being
raised by their married biological parents. Judge Posner wrote, without apparent
need for explication, that “[t]he state recognizes that family is about raising
children and not just about producing them.”147 Same-sex parents can raise
children just as well as opposite-sex parents, found the vast majority of courts
that considered the issue, even though same-sex parents cannot both be
genetically related to their children.
Defining parentage in terms of genetics marginalizes children in nongenetic
families. Commentators critique contemporary law for marginalizing “unwed”
families and nonmarital relationships,148 but a reification of genetics
marginalizes just as a reification of marriage does. The DNA default inevitably
edifies a two-parent heterosexual family and diminishes any family structure not
mimicking that ideal. Among those who are “other” in a regime in which the
DNA default goes unquestioned are (1) adoptees, particularly transracial
children, whose lack of a genetic link to their parents is often clear to third
parties, (2) any child of a single parent by choice, and (3) any child of a same-

144

Id.
See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin, The Jurisprudence of Genetics, 45
VAND. L. REV. 313, 316 (1992).
146 Roberts, supra note 45, at 231-35 (“[T]he primary threat to the Black community posed
by the social emphasis on the genetic tie . . . is the biological justification of white
supremacy.”).
147 Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 663 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d
456, 471 (9th Cir. 2014) (dismissing arguments that same-sex couples’ failure to produce
genetically related children should affect their right to marry because “marriage is not simply
about procreation”); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 383 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing data
showing that same-sex—nongenetically related—couples parent just as well as opposite-sex
genetically related couples); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1220-22 (10th Cir. 2014)
(dismissing the argument that failure to be able to produce genetically related children
justifies restricting same-sex couples from marrying).
148 See Huntington, supra note 9, at 205-10 (suggesting that the law does not extend its
helpful mediating institutions to “unwed families” and it privileges marriage); Solangel
Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination Against Nonmarital
Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345, 367-78 (2011) (describing historical and ongoing stigmas
associated with illegitimacy); Melissa Murray, What’s So New About the New Illegitimacy?,
20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 387, 436 (2012) (suggesting that the marriage equality
movement has engendered a new illegitimacy that privileges marital child-rearing above all
other forms of child-rearing).
145
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sex couple. Rooted as it is in genetic essentialism, exclusion, and
heteronormativity, the DNA default is a far more serious roadblock to same-sex
parenting, single-parent families, and multiple-parent families than is marriage.
It is the perception that parenthood might be anything other than a legal
construct, a bundle of rights and obligations that originate in law, which poses
the greatest danger to pluralistic family forms.
Being raised by genetic parents does help ensure that children have
knowledge of genetic information that could affect their own medical treatment,
and it may play a role in children’s sense of their own identity.149 But genetic
science will likely soon render the former inconsequential,150 and the importance
importance of genetic identity to psychological health is much debated.151 There
are a variety of cultures in which fatherhood is not seen as at all essential until
adolescence, and then only for boys.152 Growing evidence suggests that children

149

See id. at 686-90 (discussing the role of identity theory in adoption and artificial
insemination cases).
150 Robert F. Service, The Race for the $1000 Genome, 311 SCI. 1544, 1544-46 (2006)
(suggesting that inexpensive genome analysis will soon do a much better job of predicting
medical risks and personalizing medicine).
151 The “Open Adoption” movement, which in the 1970s and 1980s helped transform the
legal adoption process, was motivated by a belief that children who did not know their genetic
parents suffered a sense of “genealogical bewilderment.” See generally H.J. Sants,
Genealogical Bewilderment in Children with Substitute Parents, 37 BRITISH J. MED.
PSYCHOL. 133 (1964) (describing genealogical bewilderment in adoptees). Open Adoption
encouraged reforms that allowed adopted children to search for their genetic parents, and
encouraged genetic parents to maintain ties with their genetic issue, and, as a result, many
more adoptees today have some contact with their genetic parents, especially their genetic
mother. See Ulrich Müller & Barbara Perry, Adopted Persons’ Search for and Contact with
Their Birth Parents I: Who Searches and Why?, 4 ADOPTION Q. 5, 9-10 (2001) (suggesting
that many adopted individuals search for and contact their birth parents, and citing studies
that showed more adoptees were interested in meeting their birth parents in 1991 than in
1980). There is a gendered quality to genealogical bewilderment that undermines the idea that
the DNA default is important for children’s identity needs. Interviews with adoptees strongly
suggest that the yearning to know one’s genetic origins manifests itself more often in a desire
to know one’s genetic mother than one’s genetic father, so much so that scholars have used
the term “immaculate conception” to describe many adoptees’ sense of their own origins. See
BETTY JEAN LIFTON, JOURNEY OF THE ADOPTED SELF: A QUEST FOR WHOLENESS 191 (1994);
Kristine Freeark et al., Gender Differences and Dynamics Shaping the Adoption Life Cycle:
Review of the Literature and Recommendations, 75 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 86, 95 (2005).
Whether the greater identification with the mother is the result of the social construction of
the importance of motherhood, or whether it is some combination of social and biological
factors, it strongly suggests that it is not the missing genetic link, per se, that creates the sense
of bewilderment.
152 William V. Fabricius et al., Custody and Parenting Time: Links to Family Relationships
and Well-Being After Divorce, in THE ROLE OF THE FATHER IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 201, 207
(Michael E. Lamb ed., 5th ed. 2010) (explaining how the impact of father absence is culturally
contingent; if there is not a norm for the father to be there, boys do not attribute the genetic
father’s absence to his lack of caring).
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in the African-American community, which tends to be more accepting of single
motherhood, are relatively unaffected by father absence.153
More important, while there is ongoing debate about the importance to both
adoptees and children born with donated or purchased gametes to know their
genetic progenitors,154 the DNA default is about assigning parentage, with its
full complement of rights and obligations. Even if it is important for children’s
senses of identity to know whom their genetic progenitors are, it does not follow
that genetic progenitors should be assigned legal status as parents.155
***
The analysis above suggests that the DNA default imposes questionable
burdens on men, women, and children. It polices sexual activity by assigning
parentage in ways that render everything but the fact that sex happened
irrelevant to parentage. It prevents women from parenting alone if they want to,
and it legally negates women’s greater biological contribution to newborn
children. The DNA default also imports a binary heterosexual parenting norm
that inevitably marginalizes children whose family structures fall outside that
norm.
III. THE DNA DEFAULT IN PRACTICE
The DNA default’s prevalence might be justified on more practical grounds:
at least it provides children with two parents. Children have material and
emotional needs that parents are charged with meeting. The law needs some
means of assigning parentage. Perhaps the DNA default is just the best option.
This Part looks at the practical ramifications of using the DNA default. First, it
153

Kari Adamsons & Sara K. Johnson, An Updated and Expanded Meta-Analysis of
Nonresident Fathering and Child Well-Being, 27 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 589, 597 (2013) (“Among
non-White mothers who see nonresident fathering as more ‘optional,’ a lack of involvement
might be less detrimental to children’s well-being . . . .”). Cultural acceptance of
nonresidential fatherhood may lead to greater paternal involvement. Genetic AfricanAmerican fathers tend to maintain longer term contact with their genetic children by visiting
with regularity and have better relationships with the children’s mothers than do white fathers.
See Lerman & Sorenson, supra note 16, at 148-50 (finding that in the two to six years after
their children were born, thirty percent of nonmarital African-American fathers visited them
at least once per week, while only about fifteen percent of white fathers saw their nonmarital
children as frequently in the same time frame).
154 Compare Naomi Cahn, The New Kinship, 100 GEO. L.J. 367, 384 (2012) (discussing
possible harm of genetic bewilderment in donor children), with Cohen, Rethinking SpermDonation Anonymity, supra note 4, at 431-45 (responding to Cahn, and arguing that the
“identity” harm to children born with donated gametes, if extant, is likely relatively small and
outweighed by advantages to the children of being born and to the intended parents and
others).
155 Cahn argues that the United States, like many countries in Europe, should eliminate the
practice of anonymous sperm donation, but she does not argue that sperm donors should be
treated as legal parents. See Cahn, supra note 154, at 411-16 (suggesting a registry of gamete
donors).
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looks at how effectively the DNA default transfers resources to needy children.
Second, it looks at the nonpecuniary aspects of parenting to see if there are other
benefits to the law treating genetic progenitors as parents.
A.

The DNA Default and Child Support

The DNA default makes the genetic progenitors of a child liable for child
support. Since the early 1990s, as part of the congressional effort to alleviate the
federal welfare burden, all states have been required to develop comprehensive,
easily applied, income-based formulae for determining child support
liabilities.156 What a parent owes in child support is a function of his income,
and of what an econometric model predicts that someone at his and the other
parent’s income level would spend on a child if the two parents lived together
in one household.157
The methodological problems with these formulae are legion,158 and there are
strong arguments that for divorcing couples the models under assess an
appropriate child support award.159 For purposes of this Article, though, the most
most glaring limitations are reciprocal ones. The formulae and the judges who
apply them over assess child support awards for unwed genetic fathers because
they determine the obligation based on a household norm that does not exist,
and they assume income that many unwed genetic parents do not have.
Many genetic progenitors do not have enough money to establish their own
household. Some live with their own parent(s) or other relatives.160 Even when
genetic progenitors do live together after the child is born, they are often sharing

156 Adoption of the formulae was one of the conditions that Congress imposed on states to
try to alleviate the federal government’s welfare burden. See Family Support Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2346 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 667(b) (2012)); 45
C.F.R. § 302.56(c)(1)-(2), (h) (2016).
157 See generally Baker, supra note 74, at 329-31 (explaining child support formulae).
158 See id. at 340-46 (critiquing the formulae). See generally Ira Mark Ellman, Fudging
Failure: The Economic Analysis Used to Construct Child Support Guidelines, 2004 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 167 (discussing the numerous flaws in the econometric models used to create child
support formulae, including the use of averages in the data despite large variations, as well as
the use of equivalency scales that presume one can make reliable assessments of spending
patterns by looking at only a few selected expenditures).
159 See Baker, supra note 74, at 341 (questioning why the formulae should be so deferential
to the nonresidential parent); Ellman, supra note 158, at 210-12 (indicating that the models
likely underestimate expenditures on children in higher income families); Marsha Garrison,
Autonomy or Community? An Evaluation of Two Models of Parental Obligation, 86 CALIF.
L. REV. 41, 92-117 (1998) (arguing that a communitarian model that is not so solicitous of
the earner’s right to control his or her earnings should be used for child support purposes).
160 See KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET: HOW SINGLE MOTHERS
SURVIVE WELFARE AND LOW-WAGE WORK 58-64 (1997) (discussing living arrangements of
low-income parents); JUDITH STACEY, IN THE NAME OF THE FAMILY: RETHINKING FAMILY
VALUES IN THE POSTMODERN AGE 40-45 (1996) (discussing inability of low-income and
working-class men to support traditional households).
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those homes with other adults.161 Together, the genetic parents do not make
enough money to pay rent on their own. Thus, the model is based on an ideal
that is beyond the reach of many of its subjects.
Even if genetic progenitors can afford to live together alone, the costs of
living apart are greater. So, once they are not living together, they are often
spending more money on basic living expenses for themselves than they would
be if they were living together. Two households cost more than one.162 Thus,
while a parent might be able to devote twenty percent of his income to his child
if he were living with the child’s other parent and sharing living costs, a
noncustodial parent often cannot afford to support himself if he is forced to pay
twenty percent of his income to the custodial parent of his child.163
When judges attempt to apply these flawed formulae, they often just make
the situation worse. Faced with an unemployed or underemployed noncustodial
parent, judges will estimate an income for him and then order him to pay a
portion of it.164 For instance, judges may assume that a man can earn minimum
wage for forty hours a week.165 In communities with entrenched unemployment,
this is an unrealistic expectation, but failing to meet the judge’s expectations
often has dire consequences. Federal regulations require states to develop
comprehensive child support enforcement mechanisms.166 In response, some
states have implemented civil contempt sanctions, including revoking drivers’
licenses, which can limit a man’s ability to maintain or find employment.167
Other states use criminal contempt sanctions, and incarcerate men who
repeatedly fail to pay what they owe.168 While in prison, the men’s obligation
grows and their employability declines.169 In many cases, a vicious cycle
develops: underemployment leads to an inability to pay, which leads to
punishments that make finding and maintaining employment more difficult,

161

See EDIN & LEIN, supra note 160, at 24 (“In most cases, the welfare-reliant families
who shared housing with a friend or relative were able to split the rent, utilities, telephone
bill, and other household expenses.”).
162 See Baker, supra note 74, at 341 (observing that child support formulae “ignore[] . . .
the economies of scale reaped by two adults living together”).
163 Twenty percent is an approximation of what most models require a noncustodial parent
to pay in child support. See id. at 331 n.86.
164 Ann Cammett, Deadbeats, Deadbrokes, and Prisoners, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. &
POL’Y 127, 143 (2011) (“[S]ome courts actually ‘impute’ income to a parent by supplying the
court’s judgment of what their earning capacity should be, rather than actual earnings.”).
165 Id. (“Most states impute income based on full-time work at the minimum wage . . . .”).
166 Id. at 137-38.
167 Id. at 130 (“A wide range of very serious sanctions, such as onerous salary garnishment,
driver’s license suspension, re-incarceration, and many others can be triggered against parents
when they are released.”).
168 Maria Cancian, Daniel R. Meyer & Eunhee Han, Child Support: Responsible
Fatherhood and the Quid Pro Quo, 635 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 140, 149 (2011).
169 Cammett, supra note 164, at 129 (“Prisoners are also parents, and in many states they
amass huge child support arrears during a period of incarceration.”).
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which leads to even less ability to pay, which leads to even greater child support
arrears.
Somewhat unintentionally, the real beneficiaries of the federal effort to
overhaul child support collection may have been women who were never that
likely to receive federal aid. Middle- and upper-class women, who were
traditionally awarded extensive custody, but received erratic, highly
discretionary, and under-enforced child support awards have benefited from the
federal push to normalize child support awards and enforcement. Divorcing
fathers used to contest reasonable child support awards much more
successfully170 and effectively evade enforcement by moving across state lines
if they did not approve of the award.171 The formulae diminished the efficacy of
the first strategy172 and federal legislation facilitating intrastate enforcement of
child support orders greatly reduced the efficacy of the second.173
That federal legislation, coupled with political efforts to demonize the
nonpaying noncustodial parent as a “deadbeat dad” probably did help shift child
support norms so that it is now much less socially acceptable than it once was
for divorced fathers to underpay. Most noncustodial parents pay what they owe
voluntarily.174 But that story of norm transformation is largely irrelevant to the
twenty-six percent of noncustodial parents who live in poverty,175 eighty-eight
percent of whom do not pay child support.176 It is these men who owe the vast
amount of unpaid child support,177 and they are not paying what they owe
because they do not have it. As others have noted, the money spent on
enforcement against these men would likely be better spent directly on

170 See Nancy Thoennes, Patricia Tjaden & Jessica Pearson, The Impact of Child Support
Guidelines on Award Adequacy, Award Variability, and Case Processing Efficiency, 25 FAM.
L.Q. 325, 326-27 (1991) (explaining how judges have wide discretion in determining child
support awards before the guidelines).
171 For an explanation of the difficulties in interstate enforcement prior to the Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act, see generally LESLIE HARRIS, LEE E. TEITELBAUM & JUNE R.
CARBONE, FAMILY LAW 807-24 (4th ed. 2010).
172 See Thoennes, Tjaden & Pearson, supra note 170, at 341 (“Most of the judges and
attorneys we surveyed thought the passage of guidelines had led to more voluntary
stipulations on child support and fewer contested cases.”).
173 See HARRIS, TEITELBAUM & CARBONE, supra note 171, at 813-14 (describing federal
legislation facilitating interstate enforcement of child support obligations).
174 Leslie Joan Harris, Reconsidering the Criteria for Legal Fatherhood, 1996 UTAH L.
REV. 461, 476.
175 Tonya L. Brito, Fathers Behind Bars: Rethinking Child Support Policy Toward LowIncome Noncustodial Fathers and Their Families, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 617, 646
(2012) (“About twenty-six percent of noncustodial fathers (about 2.8 million) are poor, and
the vast majority of this group (approximately eighty-eight percent) does not pay any child
support.”).
176 Id.
177 Id. at 649 (“No- and low-income parents are responsible for the greatest portion of
unpaid child support . . . .”).

2016]

THE DNA DEFAULT AND ITS DISCONTENTS

2069

children.178 In other words, trying to enforce the pecuniary side of fatherhood,
which has always been the motivating principle for the DNA default, has
minimal economic impact on the children it is trying to help.
Whether the DNA default serves nonpecuniary purposes is harder to evaluate.
Section III.B evaluates contemporary genetic fatherhood in the communities in
which the DNA default has the most salience. It suggests that notwithstanding
numerous recent scholarly proposals to reinvigorate father’s rights in lowincome communities, the DNA default is no more able to provide effectively for
children emotionally, than it is to provide for them financially. In practice, the
DNA default does not work.
B.

The DNA Default and Custodial Rights

The vast majority of unwed genetic fathers are aware of their genetic
children’s existence.179 An unwed mother usually tells the man whom she thinks
is the genetic father that she is pregnant soon after she finds out. Eighty percent
of unwed fathers are still romantically involved with the mother when the child
is born.180 This is in part why the VAP campaign has been so successful. Most
of these men visit the mother in the hospital right after birth.181 They are in close
enough contact with the mother that it is fairly easy to get them to
“acknowledge” paternity.182 Half of unwed genetic fathers even live with the
mother at the time the child is born.183
Numerous commentators point to these romantic relationships between
genetic mothers and fathers as proof that fathers should be considered coparents
at birth.184 Relying on recent empirical and ethnographic work, done particularly

178

See HARRIS, TEITELBAUM & CARBONE, supra note 171, at 484 (suggesting the costs
saved from the end of child-support enforcement could be used to expand public assistance
to families with children); Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Fatherhood: Welfare Reform,
Child Support Enforcement, and Fatherless Children, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 325, 351-52
(2005) (describing how increased child support enforcement has not reduced child poverty
for families on welfare because the money that gets collected does not go to the children
unless the amount is greater than what the custodial parent would receive in welfare benefits,
which is rare).
179 See Lerman & Sorenson, supra note 16, at 146.
180 Sara S. McLanahan & Irwin Garfinkel, Fragile Families: Debate, Facts, and Solutions,
in MARRIAGE AT THE CROSSROADS: LAW, POLICY, AND THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF TWENTYFIRST-CENTURY FAMILIES 142, 145 (Marsha Garrison & Elizabeth S. Scott eds., 2012).
181 Id. at 145-46.
182 See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C)(ii) (2012) (requiring states to establish “a hospital-based
program for the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity focusing on the period immediately
before or after the birth of a child).
183 McLanahan & Garfinkel, supra note 180, at 145 (noting that fifty percent of unmarried
parents live together at the time of their child’s birth).
184 See id. at 144 (contending that some scholars argue nonmarital childbearing is not a
problem because unmarried parents are just like married parents except for the marriage
license); supra note 10 (arguing that unwed fathers should be treated more like wed fathers
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in inner city, low-income communities in which nonmarital birth is the norm,
these authors emphasize that most unwed genetic fathers are not deadbeat dads
who blithely ignore their genetic children.185 Many of these men profess strong
desires to be a part of their genetic children’s lives.186 The romantic relationship
between mother and father rarely lasts, but these men say that they want to stay
connected to their children.187
Combining these assessments of unwed genetic couples with data showing
that children of divorce benefit from meaningful, loving relationships with both
parents after divorce, scholars argue that the law of parenthood deprives unwed
fathers and their children of relationships that could and should be beneficial to
them. Thus, Clare Huntington argues that both genetic parents should have a
right to legal and physical custody at birth and that genetic fathers should have
custody orders in place immediately after birth.188 While not fully endorsing a
presumption of shared parenting time, Solangel Maldonado argues that by not
legislating shared parenting time, the law wrongly endorses a status quo in
which mothers have primary custody.189 Sociologists Kathryn Edin and Timothy
Timothy Nelson note the lack of legal protection for unwed fathers’ interests in
their children and argue that “[i]f we truly believe in gender equity, then we must
find a way to honor fathers’ attempts to build relationships with their
children.”190
In a series of articles and a book, Merle Weiner suggests that the law should
adopt a new status, the “parent-partner status,” which would exist apart from
marriage.191 The status would be mandatory for all genetic parents of sexually
produced children, and would impose a series of rights and obligations vis-à-vis
each other and for the sake of the child.192 In a similar vein, Mayeri argues that
because they have comparable romantic relationships with mothers at birth).
185 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 178, at 353 (“[M]any of the men owing child support are
in fact dead broke.”).
186 See Lerman & Sorenson, supra note 16, at 145.
187 More than ninety-five percent of genetic fathers that cohabitate with the mother at the
time of birth provide some financial support and visit the mother in the hospital. McLanahan
& Garfinkel, supra note 180, at 145-46. More than seventy percent of genetic fathers who
were no longer romantically involved with the mother said they wanted to help raise their
child. Id. If these men have signed a VAP, as most of them have, they have standing to go to
court to secure more visitation time or custodial rights if they feel they are being unfairly
denied custodial time, but most do not. See Huntington, supra note 9, at 205.
188 Huntington, supra note 9, at 170, 227.
189 Maldonado, supra note 10, at 633.
190 EDIN & NELSON, supra note 10, at 227.
191 WEINER, supra note 12, at 133.
192 Id. (“[T]he parent-partner status would automatically impose obligations between
parents that would last throughout their child’s minority. The parents’ mutual obligations
would arise upon the birth . . . of their child.”). The obligations would include a duty to aid, a
duty not to abuse, a duty to work on the relationship at the transition to (just) parenthood from
conjugality, a duty of good faith and fairness, and a duty to give care or share. See id. at 135;
Merle H. Weiner, Thinking Outside the Custody Box: Moving Beyond Custody Law to Achieve

2016]

THE DNA DEFAULT AND ITS DISCONTENTS

2071

in combatting what she calls “marital supremacy,” the state must support
nonmarital conjugal unions.193 Robin Lenhardt suggests that in recognizing
modern parenthood the law “find[] unmarried black couples with children, in
particular, where they are.”194 While not as specific as Weiner, both Mayeri and
Lenhardt seem to assume that a child born as the result of a conjugal union—to
a “couple”—should be legally recognized as the child of both members of that
“couple.”
This Section argues that these scholars and the law should be more careful in
assigning a designation of parent and/or family. To call adults who have had sex
“parents” because they had sex that produced a child, or to assume that they
should be considered “family” because they attempted to live together once, asks
the law to respect and fortify many relationships that are exceedingly unlikely
to survive. It assumes that adults are going to be able to support and respect each
other because the law says they should. The law is not that powerful.195 There is
a significant difference between asking people who have never been willing to
commit to or trust each other to do so because their conjugal relationship
produced a child, and asking people who have been willing to cooperate, trust,
and respect each other in the past, to try to maintain parts of that relationship for
the sake of children.
In the context of divorce, that is, when the custody dispute is between two
people that have previously decided to commit to each other legally, to live
together, have a child together, and jointly raise that child for a period time, law
reform efforts have been quite successful in helping former spouses transition
to substantially equal shared parenting time and joint custody arrangements.196
Joint custody has been made successful for a significant portion of divorcing

Shared Parenting and Shared Custody, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1536, 1572.
193 Serena Mayeri, Marriage (In)equality and the Historical Legacies of Feminism, 6
CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 126, 134 (suggesting that the state must recognize nonmarital
relationships that produce children). Mayeri coined the term “marital supremacy” in an earlier
article. See Mayeri, supra note 14, at 1279 n.2 (defining “marital supremacy” as the “legal
privileging of marriage over non-marriage, and marital over nonmarital families”).
194 Robin A. Lenhardt, Marriage as Black Citizenship?, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1317, 1357
(2015) (assuming that the “fragile black famil[y]” is the genetic family).
195 To be fair, both Huntington and Weiner acknowledge that norms of cooperation and
respect, not just legal requirements, will be critical to their proposals. See WEINER, supra note
12, at 199 (explaining that a supportive coparenting relationship based on cooperation and
respect after a breakup is important to children); Huntington, supra note 9, at 224. They
suggest that the law must foster those norms for nonmarital couples. See WEINER, supra note
12, at 228 (stating that the law should influence the social norms surrounding a parent-partner
relationship by communicating societal expectations to society members); Huntingon, supra
note 9, at 224 (suggesting that a new theoretical framework for legal regulations will lead to
different legal rules, institutions, and social norms). But the ability of the law to foster those
norms between people who have been unwilling to commit to each other legally is
questionable. See infra text accompanying notes 251-268.
196 See Huntington, supra note 9, at 237 (stating that family law goes to great lengths to
protect the involvement of both parents following a divorce).
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couples by: (1) a growing recognition that marital dissolution need not, and
should not, be as adversarial as once thought; (2) an increasing commitment to
mediation and counseling for joint custody arrangements; and (3) the breakdown
of gender roles in marriages, so that joint decision-making and joint physical
custody after divorce better mimic the life that the parties had when the marriage
was intact.197 As Marsha Pruett and Herbie DiFonzo conclude, there is
“widespread agreement among professionals that children generally have
improved prospects after separation and divorce when they have healthy, loving
relationships with two parents before and after separation and divorce.”198 They
also note that the “[s]ocial science research strongly supports shared
parenting . . . when both parents agree to it.”199 The scholars who endorse equal
parental rights at birth for unwed parents usually point to the success of these
shared parenting arrangements as proof that children and their genetic fathers
would benefit from legal presumptions or strong nudges toward more equal
parenting time.200
However, a more complete analysis of the joint custody data suggests that the
likelihood of successful coparenting is exceedingly low for most of the parents
impacted by the DNA default. As Pruett and DiFonzo explain, the data on joint
parenting is more nuanced than many acknowledge.201 The feasibility of joint
parenting and the benefits it may provide for children are almost completely
dependent on parents’ ability to cooperate. Indeed, robust empirical evidence
suggests that “whether the mother and the father can effectively cooperate as coparents has emerged as an important, if not the most important, determinant of
a child’s ultimate level of wellbeing.”202 Various researchers list common
factors as essential for effective joint custody agreements. These include
effective communication between the parents, cooperation, equality of
negotiating power, and trust.203 Among the variables that contraindicate joint
197

CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 1, at 127-28 (describing increasing public and state
acceptance of joint custody for divorcing couples).
198 Marsha Kline Pruett & J. Herbie DiFonzo, Closing the Gap: Research Policy, Practice,
and Shared Parenting, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 152, 159 (2014).
199 Id. at 154 (explaining that shared parenting consists of frequent, continuing, and
meaningful contact).
200 See Huntington, supra note 9, at 232-33 (suggesting mediation centers be established
to help unwed parents navigate joint parenting); Maldonado, supra note 10, at 634
(advocating a legal requirement of joint parenting plans for unwed parents).
201 See Pruett & DiFonzo, supra note 198, at 153-54 (explaining that the data does not
support the notion that joint custody is always appropriate).
202 Jeffrey T. Cookston et al., Effects of the Dads for Life Intervention on Interparental
Conflict and Coparenting in the Two Years After Divorce, 46 FAM. PROCESS 123, 134 (2006)
(citation omitted). The father’s relationship with the mother consistently emerges as the most
important variable in whether the father can maintain a significant relationship with his
children. See NANCY E. DOWD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD 3 (2000) (stating that the strength
of the father’s paternal involvement with his children prior to divorce is not as important as
his ongoing relationship with the mother).
203 Nancy Ver Steegh & Dianna Gould-Saltman, Joint Legal Custody Presumptions: A
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custody are conflict between the parties, rigid arrangements, safety concerns,
and children under age four.204
It is very difficult to find the qualities and criteria that experts consider
essential for shared custody in the communities in which most low-income
unwed genetic parents live, and it is quite easy to find the variables that
contraindicate joint custody. To explore why, one needs to dive into the
empirical work of Sara McLanahan at the Fragile Families Project, who has been
collecting data on low-income nonmarital child-rearing situations for over
twenty years205 and the ethnographies of Kathryn Edin, who, with two different
coauthors, Maria Kefalas and Timothy Nelson, has produced magnificent
studies of parenthood in the inner city.206 These two datasets, one quantitative,
one qualitative, provide most of the evidence upon which the legal scholars
writing about the plight of unwed genetic fathers rely.207 The data shows genetic
fathers and mothers attempting to be loving, sympathetic genetic parents, but it
also reveals relationships between adults that are steeped in distrust, minimal
mutual respect, and strong resistance to any kind of interdependence.

Troubling Shortcut, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 263, 264 (2014). Australia implemented an impressive
comprehensive program to decrease adversarial custody arrangements, including significant
expenditures on mediation for parties of all income levels; the data from the program suggests
that joint custody works, but only among parents who “respect each other as parents, who
cooperate, who can avoid or contain conflict when they communicate, who can compromise,
and who have arrangements that are child-focused and flexible.” Bruce Smyth et al.,
Legislating for Shared-Time Parenting After Parental Separation: Insights from Australia?,
77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 112 (2014). Not surprisingly, these arrangements work best
for parents with higher incomes, who live near each other, and have flexible work hours. Id.
at 111-12. A significant number of cases in Australia must contain one or more of these
disqualifying variables, because even with all of the mediation help, the number of families
who maintain joint physical custody agreements has stabilized at around fifteen percent. Id.
at 130.
204 Smyth et al., supra note 203, at 141 (explaining which variables reduce the success of
joint custody).
205 See Sara McLanahan et al., Unwed Fathers and Fragile Families 1 (Ctr. for Research
on Child Wellbeing & Fragile Families, Working Paper No. 98-12, 1998),
http://crcw.princeton.edu/workingpapers/wp98-12-FF-McLanahan.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X4PJ-2WX7]; About the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study,
FRAGILE FAM. & CHILD WELLBEING STUDY, http://www.fragilefamilies.princeton.edu/about
[https://perma.cc/LZ9E-WFT6] (last visited Sept. 17, 2016).
206 See generally KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR
WOMEN PUT MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE (2005); EDIN & NELSON, supra note 10.
207 Cahn and Carbone, Huntington, Lenhardt, Maldonado, and Weiner all rely on the work
from the Fragile Family Project and Edin. See CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 1, at 73;
HUNTINGTON, supra note 12, at 41, 104; WEINER, supra note 12, at 26, 42; Lenhardt, supra
note 194, at 1349-50; Maldonado, supra note 10, at 633, 636.
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Unlike married couples who usually jointly plan for children,208 pregnancy
for most low-income women is rarely a result of a decision to have a child.209
Instead it is the result of a semimutual assessment of the couples’ level of
“togetherness”—which marks the time at which they cease using condoms.210
While approximately half of unwed genetic parents are cohabiting at the time of
birth (another thirty-two percent are romantically involved),211 most move in
together because of the pregnancy.212 The decision to move in together is not
experienced as an expression of commitment to each other.213
Living together tends to exacerbate problems in the relationship because
women view it as a time to test the man’s ability to parent. Pregnant women
transform themselves overnight “for the sake of the baby”;214 genetic fathers do
not. Indeed, a genetic father’s “drinking and drugging” often gets worse and his
frequent “brazen infidelities,” about which he is often less than truthful, breeds
tremendous disdain and distrust.215 While the birth itself acts as a kind of “magic
moment,”216 during which past misdeeds are forgiven and hope for the future
allows both men and women to sign the VAP with ease, “the speed at which
couples break up only reflects the essential truth of these relationships—that
beneath the façade of family-like ties, these men seldom have a strong

208

See CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 1, at 128 (“For college graduates, two-parent
relationships arise from planning [and] [t]hey remain likely to marry before they give birth;
disputes over paternity are relatively rare.”).
209 EDIN & NELSON, supra note 10, at 53 (reporting that only fifteen percent of low-income
pregnancies are planned, as reported by Philadelphia and Camden fathers).
210 Id. at 24 (explaining how the decision to stop using condoms is often meant to convey
a level of sexual fidelity—which decreases the risk of STD transmission—rather than a desire
to have a child).
211 See Sara McLanahan et al., Strengthening Fragile Families, BROOKINGS (Oct. 26,
2010),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/strengthening-fragile-families/
[https://perma.cc/MH2X-JLKG].
212 EDIN & NELSON, supra note 10, at 41 n.27 (“[S]ome of these couples live together
before conception, but a good number of them enter cohabitation ‘shotgun.’”).
213 From the genetic fathers’ perspectives, “[t]he women who bear [their] children seem to
be indistinguishable from others that they ‘get with’ but don’t happen to become pregnant.”
Id. at 30.
214 EDIN & KEFALAS, supra note 206, at 53. “[T]he way in which a young woman reacts in
the face of a pregnancy is viewed as a mark of her worth as a person.” Id. at 43. Motherhood
has a “transforming influence, leading them to abandon their ‘drinking and drugging.’” Id. at
184.
215 See id. at 58, 89, 93; EDIN & NELSON, supra note 10, at 76 (“[T]here is no denying that
the men typically ‘rip and run’ a lot before the baby comes and are far less likely than the
mothers of their children to stay on the straight and narrow after the birth.”). The drinking
and infidelity often breeds distrust. See EDIN & KEFALAS, supra note 206, at 93, 126; EDIN &
NELSON, supra note 10, at 112 (“[A] strong current of mistrust . . . pervades these
relationships from start to finish.”).
216 EDIN & KEFALAS, supra note 206, at 7-8.
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attachment to their children’s mothers.”217 The couple “emerge[s] from the
euphoria of the delivery room only to find they have astoundingly little in
common.”218 By the time the child is old enough to benefit from shared
custody—experts agree that significant sharing of custody before age four is
harmful to a child219—half of both unwed genetic mothers and fathers have
produced another child with another partner, thus greatly exacerbating tensions
and jealousies in the original couple.220
The mothers are well aware of how weak the attachment is between the
genetic parents. It is that recognition that makes mothers reject any kind of
dependence on genetic fathers, even if the parents do move in together. Mothers
assume one hundred percent of the provider role for themselves and their

217

EDIN & NELSON, supra note 10, at 77.
Id. at 78.
219 Smyth et al., supra note 203, at 141; see also Pruett & DiFonzo, supra note 198, at 16162 (asserting that the benefits of shared custody can be reduced or reversed if a child is too
young).
220 See McLanahan & Garfinkel, supra note 180, at 152, 154 (reporting that forty-five
percent of genetic mothers and forty-seven percent of genetic fathers have another child by
the time their first child is five years old and that blended families have more problems than
traditional two-parent families). Forcing adults to mediate equal parenting time with multiple
ex-partners and their genetic children—if it is even logistically possible—is not likely to work
in practice. See id. at 154 (“[J]ealousy is a serious problem for many unmarried couples, and
mothers often object to fathers spending time with children in other households because it
means spending time with the children’s mothers.”) Researchers in this area acknowledge the
instability problems associated with multipartner fertility. See EDIN & NELSON, supra note 10,
at 186-209 (discussing norm of serial fatherhood and the tensions that grow between expartners when new partners arrive); Huntington, supra note 9, at 201 (discussing conflicting
loyalties with multipartner fertility); McLanahan & Garfinkel, supra note 180, at 153 (stating
that partnership instability reduces the quality of both genetic parents’ parenting).
Many children in these situations will inevitably feel abandoned by genetic fathers who
cannot maintain meaningful parenting relationships with all of their children. These children
might be less likely to feel abandoned, though, if they did not assume that their genetic progenitor was supposed to be their father. Because of different single parenthood norms in the
African-American community, African-American children already feel less abandoned by
their genetic fathers than do most white and Latino children. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. If the law is not going to stop genetic fathers from having more genetic children
than they can meaningfully parent, at least it can stop those men from being the legal parents
of children who will feel abandoned by their absence. Children conceived with purchased
sperm and raised by single mothers usually refer to their sperm provider as a “donor.” See
Discussing Donor Conception, SPERM BANK CAL., https://www.thespermbankofca.org/content/discussing-donor-conception-your-child-0 [https://perma.cc/V3SC-67RP] (last visited
Sept. 23, 2016) (listing recommended sources on how to explain sperm donation to one’s
child). They may be curious about his existence, but they do not mistake him for a father. See
Baker, supra note 38, at 688-89 n.194 (comparing the difference between the sense of abandonment that some adoptees feel with the curiosity that children conceived with donated gametes express).
218
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children.221 Being able to rely completely on her own earnings is what a woman
feels gives her the leverage to demand better behavior from a potential
partner.222 More important, it helps ensure that the state will not take her child.223
The male progenitors accept—and view as inevitable—the mother’s complete
responsibility for the child’s material and emotional needs.224 “[S]he, he and the
community at large assign her—not them—ultimate parental responsibility.”225
Joint custody and more equal shared parenting after divorce were ideas born
at a time when mainstream culture and the law were trying to eradicate or
minimize traditional gender roles in parenting. Today, marital gender roles have
become far less rigid.226 Most men in modern marriages profess far less
allegiance to traditional male prerogatives,227 but Edin and Kefalas observe that
low-income men are a “notable exception”228 to this belief in egalitarianism.
Carbone and Cahn write:
The new gender bargain on which these relatively egalitarian norms rest[]
does not reflect working-class realities. The identification of marriage with

221

See EDIN & KEFALAS, supra note 206, at 81. Mothers will accept support, in kind or in
cash, from a child’s genetic father and they do not necessarily demand that fathers pay what
the state says they owe. Edin and Kefalas report that when the couple stays together, the
mother does not demand that the father pay what his state-imposed obligation would be, id.
at 69-70, and almost twenty-five percent of custodial parents who do not have a child support
order say they did not file because they feel the other parent could not afford to pay it. See
HARRIS, TEITELBAUM & CARBONE, supra note 171, at 543 (citing TIMOTHY S. GRALL, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, CUSTODIAL MOTHERS AND FATHERS AND THEIR CHILD SUPPORT: 2005, at 5
(2007),
https://www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/p60-234.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9HGK3T9L]). Still, being able to provide for their children is part of how mothers define
parenthood. They see it as an essential part of their role as parent and they believe a worthy
father should see it comparably. EDIN & KEFALAS, supra note 206, at 79. As one mother said,
“[t]hat’s what being a family is—you have to bring a paycheck home.” Id. at 77.
222 See EDIN & KEFALAS, supra note 206, at 203-04 (arguing that poor single women want
to reach their economic goals on their own because she can “follow through on her threat to
leave [a potential partner] without being ‘left with nothing’”).
223 EDIN & NELSON, supra note 10, at 120.
224 See id. at 18 (stating that genetic fathers believe that “being there,” not providing
financial support or discipline, is their most important job).
225 Id. at 81. Genetic fathers often want to be friends to their children, as Edin and Nelson
note, “this definition of fatherhood leaves all of the hard jobs—the breadwinning, the
discipline, and the moral guidance—to the moms.” Id. at 18.
226 See CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 1, at 93 (“[Modern marriage] rests on a new social
script . . . [of] interdependence . . . [and] assumes commensurate contributions; . . . [p]erhaps
most critically, though, it assumes joint responsibility—for both the family’s finances and
any resulting children.”).
227 See Richard J. Harris & Juanita M. Firestone, Changes in Predictors of Gender Role
Ideologies Among Women: A Multivariate Analysis, 38 SEX ROLES 239, 240 (1998)
(indicating that education level (which correlates with marriage likelihood) and participation
in the labor force correlate with belief in gender equity for both men and women).
228 See EDIN & KEFALAS, supra note 206, at 117, 203 (noting that the low-income men in
their studies believe in “traditional sex roles”).
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interdependence and sharing not only fails to express the implicit terms of
working-class relationships; it ties it to a script that assumes two adults
making comparable, if not always equal, investments in the relationship.229
Unwed genetic fathers and mothers in the low-income communities that have
been studied do not come close to making comparable investments in their
children.
Nonetheless, scholars calling for shared parenting between unwed genetic
parents criticize mothers for not giving the genetic father sufficient opportunity
to visit with his genetic child.230 In assessing how problematic this
“gatekeeping” is, one should probably be careful to put oneself in the shoes of
the mother.231 Many of the genetic fathers who want greater legal protection for
their custodial time are the same ones who could not stop “drinking and
drugging” when their children were born.232 One-third of the mothers that Edin

229

CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 1, at 118.
See Huntington, supra note 9, at 202 (criticizing maternal “gatekeeping” and the
control that mothers assert over custody); Maldonado, supra note 10, at 634 (worrying that
mothers have too much power to deny unmarried fathers the access to their children). Edin
and Nelson document numerous incidents of gatekeeping and highlight one mother for not
letting her child visit the genetic father who, for financial reasons, had to move in with a man
accused of raping his girlfriend’s daughter. EDIN & NELSON, supra note 10, at 164. Edin and
Nelson suggest that because the charges against the alleged rapist were dropped, the mother
should not have interfered with visitation. Id. With regard to this example, one might pause
to consider what would happen if the genetic father had the formal visitation rights that
scholars are asking for. Would a judge order the mother to facilitate the visitation at the home
of the alleged rapist? At a minimum, wouldn’t the judge require a hearing to determine the
validity of the abuse claim? Would any of the parties have the resources to participate
meaningfully in that hearing? What some call gatekeeping others might well call appropriate
caution—especially given the levels of distrust between the genetic parents.
231 Plenty of middle class women go to court based on less evidence of malfeasance than
the women in Edin’s work regularly witness. See Janet R. Johnston et al., Allegations and
Substantiations of Abuse in Custody-Disputing Families, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 283, 291 (2005)
(detailing custody fights over alleged “abuse” and reporting that many allegations of abuse
raised in custody-disputing families are not substantiated). In the last year, national news has
included stories of two children who were shot and killed by bullets intended for their ganginvolved genetic fathers. See Brandon Blackwell, Former Gang Member Believes Bullet That
Killed 3-Year-Old Cleveland Boy Was Meant for Him, CLEVELAND.COM (Sept. 16, 2015,
2:44 PM),
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2015/09/
former_gang_member_believes_bu.html
[https://perma.cc/CC9T-7R7M];
Meredith
Rodriguez et al., Top Cop: Boy, 7, Killed by ‘Bullet Meant for His Father’, CHI. TRIB. (July
5, 2015, 4:45 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-grandmother-ofslain-boy-7-who-would-do-that-to-a-baby-20150705-story.html
[https://perma.cc/B897YKT5]. Would gatekeeping by those mothers have been appropriate? Edin and Kefalas report
that most mothers have a low tolerance for criminal activity in the child’s genetic father
because it is so likely to endanger the child and lead to the father’s absence. See EDIN &
KEFALAS, supra note 206, at 84. Is that inappropriate gatekeeping or appropriate parental
caution?
232 The community’s norms and her own sense of responsibility for the child usually
compel the mother to stop drinking and drugging once she becomes pregnant. See EDIN &
230
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and Kefalas spoke with attributed the break-up of their relationship with the
father to his alcoholism or drug addiction.233 Another third mentioned criminal
activity and/or jail time.234 Fifty percent involved domestic violence.235
If expanding legal rights of genetic fathers threatens genetic mothers’ ability
to gatekeep, those mothers are likely to be able to invoke the law to strip genetic
fathers of the presumptive rights the scholars want to provide for them. The
process of doing that is likely to do little more than cost money (that might go
to the child) and increase the acrimony between the parties. In the relationships
described by McLanahan and Edin, a mother could easily divest an unwed father
of his parental rights entirely by showing that he is unfit; chemical dependency,
domestic violence, and criminal activity are all grounds for finding unfitness.236
Even if the mother does not move to terminate all of the genetic father’s
parental rights, if he is assigned parenting time and does not show up, because
he has a new girlfriend or new baby, or is on a bender, in jail, or running from
the police, all of which are perfectly likely according to Edin and Nelson, then
the mother can move against him to minimize his rights. Currently, the mother
is the one who decides whether he is fit enough to exercise visitation.237
However petty and jealous she may be at times, she is likely much more
forgiving of community norms involving addiction, irresponsibility, and some
illegality than the law will ever be.
The scholars calling for more equal parenting time are really arguing that the
burden should be on the mother to show that the genetic father should not receive
equal custodial time, not on him to show that he deserves more time. As
mentioned above, any man who has signed a VAP has standing, as a legal father,
to go to court to secure more parental rights or a parenting plan.238 There are
numerous reasons why men in these situations may not want to go to court.
Going to court is costly and time-consuming, and few people enjoy sharing
intimate details of their lives with strangers. But the mother does not want to go
to court either. If joint custody and a joint parenting plan are to be the
presumptions at birth, then these scholars are saying that the genetic connection
alone justifies putting the burden of going to court on her.
KEFALAS, supra note 206, at 53. She stops. He does not. Of course she resents him. Do the
demands of gender equality force the law to ignore her greater willingness to sacrifice for the
sake of the child?
233 Id. at 81.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 See generally Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Grounds for Involuntary Termination
WELFARE
INFO.
GATEWAY
(2013),
of
Parental
Rights,
CHILD
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/groundtermin.pdf#page=2&view=Grounds
[https://perma.cc/J6E7-3GCK] (discussing various grounds for termination of parental
rights).
237 See EDIN & NELSON, supra note 10, at 214 (“[M]ost states do virtually nothing to ensure
visitation agreements are honored.”).
238 See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(D)(iii) (2012).
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Presumably, scholars are willing to impose greater burdens on unwed mothers
because they believe it will be in the father’s and the child’s interest to protect
the relationship, but the data on the importance of genetic father involvement in
children’s lives is mixed.239 The quality of parenting, including a willingness to
be authoritative, matters as much as the quantity of parenting, and unwed genetic
fathers often resist authoritative parenting.240 Several studies have concluded
that social or functional fathers (i.e., those living with the child) engage in higher
quality parenting than do genetic fathers,241 particularly if the mother is married
to the social father.242 Married mothers trust their husbands, regardless of
whether their husbands are genetically related to the child, more than they trust
the child’s genetic father.243 Researchers surmise that marriage helps
institutionalize the relationship between the functional parents, enabling trust
between them and providing stability for the child.244
In many low-income situations, mothers eventually come to the conclusion
that it is easier for them and better for the child to just parent alone, without
either a social or a genetic father.245 William Julius Wilson writes, “[f]rom the
point of view of day-to-day survival, single parenthood reduces the emotional

239

Lerman & Sorenson, supra note 16, at 139.
See Paul R. Amato & Joan G. Gilbreth, Nonresident Fathers and Children’s WellBeing: A Meta-Analysis, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 557, 565 (1999) (“[E]xtent to which fathers
engage in authoritative parenting . . . [is] related to children’s well-being.”); see also Kari
Adamsons & Sara K. Johnson, An Updated and Expanded Meta-Analysis of Nonresident
Fathering and Child Well-Being, 27 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 589, 595 (2013) (explaining that
quality of engagement and authoritative parenting is more important than “just being there”);
Sandra L. Hofferth, Nicole D. Forry & H. Elizabeth Peters, Child Support, Father-Child
Contact, and Preteens’ Involvement with Nonresidential Fathers: Racial/Ethnic Differences,
31 J. FAM. & ECON. ISSUES 14, 15-16 (2009) (discussing research showing that for
nonresidential fathers, contact itself does not have a positive impact; the contact must be
positive or authoritative). Providing special treats for the child, while leaving the homework
and discipline to the other parent, has been shown to have minimal beneficial impact on
children—though this is exactly what many of the men in Edin and Nelson’s study wanted in
their role as father. See EDIN & NELSON, supra note 10, at 144-51 (describing men who
“provide” for their children by buying them special items, not by providing regular child
support or regular discipline).
241 Lawrence M. Berger et al., Parenting Practices of Resident Fathers: The Role of
Marital and Biological Ties, 70 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 625, 634-35 (2008); Sandra L. Hofferth
& Kermyt G. Anderson, Are All Dads Equal? Biology Versus Marriage as a Basis for
Paternal Investment, 65 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 213, 230 (2003) (“[M]arriage per se confers
advantage in terms of father involvement above and beyond the characteristics of the fathers
themselves, whereas biology does not.”).
242 See Berger et al., supra note 241, at 634-35 (“[W]e find some (marginally significant)
evidence that married social fathers are more engaged with children and take more shared
responsibility in parenting than married biological fathers.”).
243 Id. at 635-36.
244 Id.
245 See EDIN & KEFALAS, supra note 206, at 190-95 (describing how much easier parenting
became for the genetic mother once the genetic father faded away completely).
240
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burden and shields [mothers] from the type of exploitation that often
accompanies the sharing of both living arrangements and limited resources.”246
Studies trying to unpack the relative importance of marital versus biological ties
suggest that child outcomes in single parent households are just as good as child
outcomes in cohabiting or step-family households.247 In other words, a child is
no better off being raised by his unmarried genetic mother and father, or by a
stepfather married to his genetic mother, than he is being raised by a single
mother.
Recent accounts from women in the middle and lower-middle classes, who
are unlikely to ask for state support, but are increasingly likely to have children
before marriage, suggest that they are also coming to the conclusion that single
parenthood is better for them and their children. Observers relate stories of
women who would rather protect their own autonomy than try to secure child
support from their children’s father.248 Like their working class counterparts,
they know that they cannot rely on the genetic fathers for most of their children’s
needs.249 They have to provide that themselves. A mother who lets the genetic
father into her life substantially, when his job prospects are often worse than
hers,250 only runs the risk of making herself responsible for him as well. He
might be able to provide childcare, even if he cannot provide money, but his past
behavior does not give her confidence in his parenting ability. Usually, just like
his working-class counterparts, he has done little to suggest that he is able to
accept the serious responsibility of parenthood, and she does not feel that his
genetic connection makes him instantly qualified to parent. As Cahn and
Carbone summarize, “[t]he ability of men and women whose children do not
receive public benefits to walk away from each other reflects an invisible
rebalancing of relationships—the custodial parent acquires freedom from the
involvement (and potential control) of the other parent and gives up all
support.”251 These mothers become single parents by choice.

246 WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN
POOR 104-05 (1996).
247 Berger et al., supra note 241, at 637; Susan L. Brown, Family Structure & Child WellBeing: The Significance of Parental Cohabitation, 66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 351, 352 (2004).
248 CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 1, at 132 (“We frequently see . . . disputes end with the
mother’s decision to give up on collecting support in exchange for never having to deal with
the father again and the father’s acceptance of the implicit bargain as a good one; . . . [f]or
this group, autonomy means staying out of court.”); see also HANNA ROSIN, THE END OF MEN
AND THE RISE OF WOMEN 15 (2012) (noting that lower- or middle-class women are “much less
likely to be in abusive relationships, much more likely to make all the decisions about their
lives, but they are also much more likely to be raising children alone”).
249 See CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 1, at 132 (discussing data from the 2009 Census
indicating that 29.2% custodial parents cite “[o]ther parent could not afford to pay” as the
reason for not seeking a child-support order).
250 See ROSIN, supra note 248, at 121-26.
251 CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 1, at 133.
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The prevalence of lived, if not legal, single parenthood, even in households
with sexually produced children, suggests that the DNA default simply does not
work. A significant portion of the genetic fathers identified by the DNA default
do not make enough money to contribute meaningfully to the child’s economic
wellbeing. Those genetic fathers who may be able to contribute in nonfinancial
ways can only do so when the mothers let them.252 A mother’s willingness to let
the genetic father contribute usually depends on her perception that he is as
willing as she is, or willing enough, to alter his behavior for the sake of the child.
He often does not meet her expectations. So he moves on. That gives the mother
significant control, but vesting the father with more legal rights in order to
counter that maternal control is not likely to make much difference. If she does
not trust him she will ask the law to do what she already does, which is limit his
access. Given the realities of many of these unwed fathers’ lives, this will not be
hard.
The basic problem with all of the proposed plans for more equal division of
parenting time is that the proposed coparents do not see themselves as, and have
never seen themselves as, sufficiently connected or mutually trustworthy for a
coparenting relationship to work. There is no evidence that a binary relationship
marked by distrust and an unwillingness to cooperate will serve a child any
better than would a unitary parentage regime. In practice today, the binary
genetic regime is not serving anyone’s interests, and while some scholars remain
hopeful that the law can impose the norms necessary for effective coparenting
on genetic parents, the evidence from the communities in which the genetic
regime governs gives us plenty of reason to question that assumption.
IV. MARRIAGE AND PARENTAL STATUS
A parentage regime based on genetics does not hold much promise, but the
forty percent of children born in this country to unmarried mothers might well
benefit from a parentage regime that did a better job of providing meaningful
alternatives to both marriage and genetics as paths to parentage. Most
contemporary family law scholars encouraging the law to embrace new
nonmarital paradigms for parentage seem to assume that the supremacy of
marriage and the marginalization of nonmarital relationships is the problem for
nonmarital “families.” It is possible, though, that the problem is not so much the
marginalization of nonmarital families, as it is the absence of the norms that
replicate the work that marriage does in facilitating joint parenting. Put another
way, the reason that children of marital relationships do better may well have
something to do with the work that marriage is doing for parenting. One does
not have to believe that marriage is the best or the only means of securing
parental status to appreciate how it might serve as an adequate proxy for those
qualities that are likely to make good coparents, including a willingness to trust,

252 See Maldonado, supra note 10, at 634 (“[M]others have the power to deny unmarried
fathers access to their children.”).
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work with, and at times provide for, one’s coparent. Having the sex that
produces a child is not nearly as good a proxy for effective coparenting. This
Part tries to unpack the positive work that marriage does, so as to identify what
we might want alternative legal parentage frameworks to do to help ensure
higher quality parenting.
A.

The Work That Marriage Does

As every scholar of the institution recognizes, marriage involves a “complex
web of social norms and conventions.”253 Among these norms are cooperation,
mutual respect, and reciprocal, if not identical, contributions to the family.254
The law does not enforce most of these norms, though the legal rules
surrounding the classification and division of marital property embody a notion
that a married couple is an economic unit.255 People understand marriage to be
a shared endeavor, usually manifesting itself in shared residence, mutual
sacrifice, and joint decision-making. As such, it requires significant
commitment.
Because the law no longer enforces these norms directly, one of the law’s
most important roles in marriage is offering a way to formalize a commitment
to marital norms. The law requires people who want to marry to go to a judge,
or a member of the clergy, or someone who is otherwise empowered to officiate
at their formal ceremony.256 Everyone knows that one must secure a license from
from the state before one will be treated as married. The legal formalities
surrounding marriage make entry into and exit out of marriage time consuming
and symbolically weighty.
Marriage is a public institution.257 Members of a community are often asked,
or expected, to help married couples keep their commitments.258 If one cannot

253

Elizabeth S. Scott, A World Without Marriage, 41 FAM. L.Q. 537, 548 (2007); see also
Andrew Cherlin, The Growing Diversity of Two-Parent Families: Challenges for Family
Law, in MARRIAGE AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 180, at 287, 287-88 (describing the
evolving normative understandings of marriage from an institutional to a companionate to an
individualistic arrangement); Martha Garrison & Elizabeth S. Scott, Legal Regulation of
Twenty-First-Century Families, in MARRIAGE AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 180, at 303,
307 (“[M]arriage typically is grounded in a set of clear expectations . . . .”).
254 For an expanded list and further discussion of the norms of marriage, see Elizabeth S.
Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1901, 1907-11,
1910 n.17 (2000).
255 See Baker, supra note 74, at 350 (explaining and questioning how property-division
laws in divorce treat spouses as an economic entity).
256 See Katharine K. Baker, Marriage and Parenthood as Status and Rights: The Growing,
Problematic and Possibly Constitutional Trend to Disaggregate Family Status from Family
Rights, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 127, 145-46 (2010) (discussing the public nature of marriage).
257 See id. at 146 (“The ubiquitous public requirements of marriage suggest that at some
fundamental level marriage is about making a statement to others.”).
258 See Thomas B. Holman, The Influence of Community Involvement on Marital Quality,
43 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 143, 144 (1981) (describing research showing “that membership in

2016]

THE DNA DEFAULT AND ITS DISCONTENTS

2083

live up to one’s commitment, one often suffers a certain humiliation. The very
widely held understanding of marriage as a commitment helps make marriages
relatively stable, and helps ensure that the parties perceive themselves as
engaged in a mutual enterprise.
People of all income levels understand marriage in these terms. Adults in
communities that have the highest rates of nonmarital childbearing appreciate,
and often desire, the commitment, trust, and loyalty that define the marital
relationship.259 The absence of marriage in these communities does not reflect
an ideological rejection of marital norms, but a practical recognition by men and
women that they have not yet found someone whom they trust, with whom they
can cooperate, and to whom they can commit.260
For sure, acrimonious divorces can erode parties’ abilities to cooperate and
trust each other. If the acrimony is thick enough between a divorcing couple,
they become bad candidates for extensive joint parenting.261 Often, though,
divorced parents accept the need to stay respectful and trusting of their exspouses, particularly if they receive help from legal and psychological
institutions that nudge them toward understanding the benefits of shared
parenting.262 The rapid growth of mediation and collaborative divorce for
spouses with children demonstrates the growing recognition that cooperation
must be one of the hallmarks of postdivorce parenting behavior.263 Huntington
suggests that the same legal and psychological institutions should nudge unwed
parents towards norms of sharing and trust.264 That might be possible, but to
presume it is likely enough to justify embedding a presumption of equal
custodial time is to ask much, much more of unwed parents than the law asks of
divorcing parents. It is to ask those unwed parents to conform to the
communitarian, autonomy-reducing marital norms that they have specifically
eschewed.265

an organization is positively related to marital success”).
259 See EDIN & KEFALAS, supra note 206, at 120-24.
260 See id. at 119-31.
261 See supra notes 202-04.
262 See supra notes 198, 203.
263 See generally PAULINE H. TESLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW: ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE
RESOLUTION IN DIVORCE WITHOUT LITIGATION 1-5 (2d. ed. 2008) (describing the rise of the
collaborative law movement since the 1980s).
264 See Huntington, supra note 9, at 174 (“To address the problem that nonmarital families
do not have effective institutions to help forestall conflict and transition from romantic
relationships to co-parenting, this Article proposes the creation of alternative dispute
resolution structures.”).
265 Edin and Nelson, in particular, suggest that many unwed fathers are simply not up to
that task, lacking “the emotional strength to persist when things get tough.” EDIN & NELSON,
supra note 10, at 177. By “stumbling into fatherhood without explicitly planning to do so,
men’s sense of responsibility for bringing a child into the world in even wildly imperfect
circumstances is significantly diminished.” Id. at 64. They steadfastly refuse to believe that
their relationship with their child has to have anything to do with the child’s mother. See id.
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Weiner proposes a “parent-partner status” that will bring with it norms of
cooperation and trust so as to facilitate coparenting.266 In doing so, she
accurately captures how important it is for parents to understand themselves as
in a relationship with each other, but Weiner, like Huntington, assumes that the
law can impose these norms on parties who usually have chosen not to enter into
the one institution that they recognize as embodying those norms.267 The data
suggests that most unwed genetic parents do not get married precisely because
they do not want to commit to a relationship of trust and interdependence with
the other genetic parent. It is unclear why these scholars are so confident that
the law can convince genetic parents to embrace norms that the parents have
clearly rejected.
Many legal scholars criticize marriage.268 According to the critiques,
marriage is patriarchal, oppressive, stifling, dangerous, racist, conventional,
heteronormative, and boring.269 Yet those attributes of marriage are rarely the
ones cited by unwed genetic parents as the reason for eschewing marriage.270
What they eschew is the cooperation and interdependence that is necessary for
coparenting.271

at 101 (“For these men . . . childbearing and marriage have become radically separated.”).
Furthermore, although they may try to make the relationship with the woman work, “men
embrace the belief that in the end, their relationship with their child is pure and unassailable
and should have nothing to do with their relationship to the mother of that child.” Id. at 102.
266 See generally WEINER, supra note 12, at 131-83 (describing the theoretical foundation
for a parent-partner status).
267 See id. at 143-53 (discussing the parent-partner status and its effect on the legal duties
between coparents).
268 See, e.g., Katherine Franke, Dignifying Rights: A Comment on Jeremy Waldron’s
Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1177, 1197 (2011) (questioning the
marriage equality movement’s celebration of marriage); Melissa Murray, Marriage as
Punishment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 46-47 (2012) (discussing how marriage has been used to
force people, particularly African-Americans, into relationships they did not want); Nancy D.
Polikoff, Law That Values All Families: Beyond (Straight and Gay) Marriage, 22 J. AM.
ACAD. MATRIM. L. 85, 87 (2009) (arguing that marriage is not superior to other forms of
family); Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, Disestablishing the Family, 119 YALE L.J. 1236
(2010) (arguing generally for the law to cease privileging any kind of family form); Laura A.
Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 198-212 (2007) (discussing other
scholars’ discomfort with privileging marriage and suggesting the law should not channel
people into an institution rooted in patriarchy).
269 See supra note 268 and accompanying text; see also June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Red
v. Blue Marriage, in MARRIAGE AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 180, at 9, 23 (“Modernists,
who are more likely to be secularists, distrust references to sin, societally imposed morality,
or institutional rigidity [and] [i]ndeed, they often see marriage itself as an outmoded,
patriarchal institution designed to police sexuality and subordinate women to men.”).
270 See supra notes 259-60.
271 See supra note 206 and accompanying text (discussing how women want marriage, but
understand that it requires commitment and have not yet found someone they want to commit
to).
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The law needs institutional mechanisms for encouraging cooperation and
trust in relationships in which those norms have some hope of sticking. The
institution does not have to be marriage, which, as contemporary scholars
remind us, brings with it plenty of other problematic baggage, but the law does
have to provide ways of reinforcing the norms that best facilitate coparenting.
The decision to have sex does very little to help ensure that parties have an
interest in working on a long-term relationship marked by trust and mutual
respect. Thus, those scholars who assume that coparenting norms can be
imposed on parties simply because they had sex that produced a child are
probably asking the law to do something it cannot.
B.

Alternatives to Marriage

A complete description of the kind of legal parentage regime that might
incorporate the benefits of marriage for children without marriage itself is
beyond the scope of this Article, but the analysis of marital norms suggests that
at least two elements are necessary: (1) some formality, so that the parties
recognize the legality and gravity of what they are embarking on, and (2) some
degree of mutual consent, so that the parties understand that in agreeing to
parent, they are agreeing to be committed to each other as well as to the child.
Ironically, the kind of legal mechanisms that can help ensure these attributes
have been with us for some time, but few people recognize them as such. The
examples of adoption and parentage for children born via reproductive
technology, both of which require formality and mutual consent, provide useful
templates for thinking about how to develop alternative parentage regimes.
1.

Adoption and License

Adults in every state can apply for parental status through adoption. One or
two adults submit forms and fill out applications to be parents.272 If the state
approves, those adults receive a full parental license, which brings with it all of
the rights and obligations of parenthood.273 These include rights and obligations
vis-à-vis the state and vis-à-vis any other parent. As a constitutional matter, legal
parents have the primary right to regulate and influence the behavior of the
children for whom they are legal parents.274 This right, the Supreme Court has

272

See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-203 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE
LAWS 1994) (detailing the appropriate procedures for approving potential adopters).
273 See id. § 1-104 (“After a decree of adoption becomes final, each adoptive parent and
the adoptee have the legal relationship of parent and child and have all the rights and duties
of that relationship.”).
274 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.” (citing
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925))).
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long understood, is “coupled with . . . [a] high duty.”275 That duty includes an
obligation to support the child and protect it from harm.276
Understanding parenthood as a limited package of legal rights and obligations
helps explain why it should be seen as a license. Parental status is a license
because it is a formal recognition by the state that one is authorized to exercise
the rights and required to fulfill the obligations associated with parenthood. If
there is more than one person with a license to the same child, they must be
viewed as having rights and obligations vis-à-vis each other because their
individual abilities to exercise those rights and obligations are completely
contingent on the other adult’s behavior. Coparents must understand they are in
a legal relationship with each other because they are bound to each other through
a dependent child. The child’s needs become the needs of its parent. If there is
more than one parent, those parents are necessarily linked in their requirement
to meet the child’s needs.
As Huntington and Weiner rightly emphasize, understanding oneself as a
coparent with another parent is critical to an effective joint parenting
endeavor.277 Helping to parent and care for a child financially, physically, or
emotionally, requires cooperation. As every scholar of child support
acknowledges, coparents remain financially entwined for the entire period of
their child’s minority. A noncustodial parent must help pay for a custodial
parent’s rent, heat, car, and food because the custodial parent necessarily shares
these items with the child.278 As anyone who has ever tried to juggle a child’s
schedule with her own realizes, one must make oneself available, and alert
others of one’s whereabouts, if one is assuming meaningful responsibility for a
child’s day-to-day existence. As everyone who has ever tried to parent a child
through a difficult time knows, consistency and boundary-setting are critically
important to a child’s ability to understand expectations and norms. All of that
requires sharing of money, information, and one’s interactions with the child. It
is impossible to share to the extent necessary if one steadfastly refuses to see
oneself as connected to the person with whom one has to share. The law can try
to impose sharing obligations on adults, but if those adults never mutually
agreed to be legally bound to each other, the law is unlikely to be successful.
When registering for a license with someone else, individuals should be required
to aver, not that they have any genetic relationship to the child, but that they
understand themselves to have ongoing obligations to each other as parents. An

275

Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
When parents fail to support or protect a child adequately, the state exercises its parens
patriae authority to override parental action. Prince, 321 U.S. at 167 (“[T]he state has a wide
range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child’s
welfare . . . .”). Abuse and neglect proceedings are the regulatory manifestation of the state
exercising its parens patriae authority on behalf of children.
277 See WEINER, supra note 12, at 86; Huntington, supra note 9, at 202.
278 See Baker, supra note 74, at 330.
276
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intent to parent together is an intent to be legally bound to each other, not just to
the child.
2.

Contract and Mutual Consent

We already have some indication of how courts use mutual consent to
determine parental rights. Just as buyers and seller of gametes enter into
enforceable contracts that determine parental status based on something other
than genetics, so same-sex couples have entered into agreements that allow
nongenetic parents to be assigned rights and obligations. Many gay and lesbian
couples, particularly before same-sex couples were allowed to marry or enter
into civil unions, or mutually adopt a child, executed documents indicating a
desire to be legally bound in an agreement to share parental rights.279 Not all
courts honored these agreements,280 but many did. The more formal and explicit
the documents, the more willing courts are to force a signatory to comply with
the agreement.281 Thus, legal genetic parents are forced to share parental rights
with nongenetic parents because they mutually agreed to do so.
Couples who do not execute documents indicating a desire to share parental
rights often rely on some notion of implicit contract. When previously
unacknowledged parents ask courts to recognize their rights as parents in the
absence of an explicit agreement, they argue that one parent has willingly let the
other adult into the child’s life in a way that suggests an implicit agreement to
share parental rights and obligations. An implicit contract argument overlaps
substantially with “functional parenthood” arguments282 because the facts
relevant to an implicit contract also tend to show a functioning parenting
relationship. The contract between the adults in such cases—the implicit
“meeting of the minds”—is critical to the law’s willingness to accept functional
arguments.283
The American Law Institute’s attempt to codify the rights of functional
parents with the de facto parent doctrine requires “agreement of a legal parent

279

See E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 892 n.10 (Mass. 1999) (“We view the
agreement as indicative of the [legal parent’s] consent to and encouragement of the [de facto
parent’s] relationship with the child.”); J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1321 (Pa. 1996)
(holding that participation and acquiescence of legal mother in her partner’s parenting of the
child was critical in finding that partner had standing to sue for custodial rights); Rubano v.
DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 968 (R.I. 2000) (holding de facto parent’s right to visitation rooted
in executed visitation agreement with legal parent).
280 See, e.g., T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244, 1252 (Mass. 2004). Massachusetts refused to
hold the nonlegal parent liable for child support based on an informal oral agreement to share
in the rights and obligations of parenthood. Id.; see also Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d
73, 80 (Md. 2008) (declining to accept implicit contract or de facto parent theories).
281 Compare cases cited supra note 279, with cases cited supra note 280.
282 For the foundational scholarship, and for more on how functional arguments relate to
intent-based (or implicit contract) arguments, see See NeJaime, supra note 2, at 1188 n.12,
1222-30.
283 See id. (discussing the role of intentionality in functional parenthood arguments).
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[to let another adult] form a parent-child relationship.”284 Wisconsin, the state
that pioneered the de facto parent doctrine, also requires agreement.285 It is the
notion of a mutual agreement between adults to parent that is critical to explicit
and implicit parental contract claims, though wholly absent in a DNA default
regime.
This is not the place to detail the precise legal status of parental contracts, but
these agreements might operate like divorce settlement agreements do today.
Settlement agreements are usually not enforceable as contracts, per se, but they
are often accepted as is, and incorporated into court judgments.286 The parties’
discretion to structure their child support and custody agreements is limited by
the courts’ parens patriae obligation to make sure that any children’s interests
are being adequately protected, but in practice, courts afford parents
considerable deference in allocating rights and responsibilities as they want.287
Courts could afford adults comparable deference when reviewing how they want
to share their parental license.
C.

Embracing the Possibilities

Filling the void left by rejecting marriage with a regime based on license and
contract opens up possibilities for more transformative forms of parenthood. For
instance, states or counties could experiment with agreements involving more
than two parents. For these parenting arrangements, states could develop more
nuanced ways of determining support obligations. The child support formulae
that determine obligation today are rooted in a two-parent, shared-household
ideal that rarely—if ever—exists for most of the children whom it is designed
to protect.288 Any state that imposes an obligation on more than two parents now
uses formulae rooted in a wholly inapposite, binary parenthood model.289
In a new regime, states willing to entertain parental relationships involving
more than two parents could develop alternative models or let the individuals
structure the arrangement themselves. If the registered agreement serves as the
foundation of the parental relationship, those adults could bargain for the rights
and obligations of parenthood. Some states might want to limit the number of
284

PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 2.03(c)(ii) (AM. LAW INST. 2002) (explaining how in the absence of an agreement, a de facto
parent acquires standing only if there has been a “complete failure or inability of any legal
parent to perform caretaking functions”).
285 See Holtzman v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d 419, 435-36 (Wis. 1995) (making consent of the
established parent an element of establishing a functional parent claim).
286 See Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 147576 (discussing how divorcing spouse’s agreements are often rubber-stamped by courts).
287 See id.
288 See supra Section III.B.
289 To date, only a few states have been willing to assign parentage to more than two
people. See Baker, supra note 74, at 344 (discussing “the theoretical vacuum at the core of
any . . . award” for more than two parents, as child support formulae are all based on a twoparent household norm).
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parents to two or three; some might be willing to accept more parents, with
differing levels of obligation. Single parents, male or female, who do not want
to share the rights and responsibilities of parenthood, could do so freely under
such a system.
This kind of system may seem far-fetched today, but a relatively inexpensive
public education campaign could go a long way toward convincing people of its
importance.290 Nancy Polikoff suggested a kind of registration system years
ago.291 Moreover, most low-income “parents” already register for parenthood
by signing a VAP.292 What they are asked to aver by signing the VAP now is
that they have a genetic connection. What they could be asked to aver is that
they agree to share in the rights and responsibilities of parenthood.
Many low-income couples who sign VAPs today might register for this kind
of joint parental license. Perhaps the euphoria of the delivery room that leads
them to accept coparenthood today,293 will lead them to enter into a joint license
as a matter of course. If that happens, not much will change. Still, the registration
process can reinforce the principle that by signing up for parenthood, both adults
are formally binding themselves to each other and the state. Different regimes
might also develop a system, again comparable to an adoption model, that
provides for an interim license to parents that does not become final until a year
after it is signed.294 An interim year of practice may give the intended parents a
much better sense of whether they will be able to coparent than does the wonder
of the baby’s delivery.
A good way to encourage all those who intend to coparent to register with the
state would be to make the registration process mandatory, even if the intended
parents are married. This idea should come as relief to marriage critics. I have
argued that marriage serves as a decent proxy for the kind of qualities a
parentage regime should foster, but forcing married couples to register as parents
would reinforce the idea that parenthood itself is a mutual legal status
determining ones rights vis-à-vis both the state and the other parent. The more
that parents understand parenthood as a bundle of legal rights and obligations

290 As a society we manage to get most children vaccinated, registered for school, and
enrolled in a health insurance program. Surely we could design a parental registration system
that makes sure most children have licensed parents.
291 NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL
FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 134 (2008) (“A simple way to implement the valuing-all-families
approach is a registration system for those who lack a spouse/partner but wish to identify
someone considered a family member.”).
292 See supra note 61.
293 See supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
294 Although courts have grown somewhat stricter recently, a birth mother usually has up
to a year to claim fraud or duress in the signing of her adoption consent. Until the one-year
mark, the parentage of the adoptee is not final. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/11(a)
(2016); UNIF. ADOPTION ACT, supra note 272, § 702 (discussing the process of an interim
order of parenthood, which does not become final for a year).
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that emanate from the state, not nature, the easier it will be to effectuate
comprehensive registration.
There is also the question of parental status at birth for sexually produced
children. Perhaps women should be presumed parents because—absent a
surrogacy contract to the contrary—they intended to be parents, by virtue of
them not terminating the pregnancy, and they contributed all of the resources
(save one small sperm) and labor necessary for the child’s existence. States
could be free to approach this issue in different ways also. Some states might
make the birth mother a presumptive parent, whose parental status was hers for
the taking as long as she registered, and hers for the sharing if she entered into
a mutual agreement with someone else. Constitutional doctrine suggests that this
would be appropriate.295
Other states, possibly in the name of gender equality, might make a newborn
child the child of no one, and leave it up to the state to assign parentage to the
first or best person to apply. In most instances, this would probably be the birth
mother, but at the licensing stage, she might have competition.
Once it becomes clear that parentage, like all designations of family, are
questions of politics and law, not questions of science and fact, then the
possibilities for family formation become almost infinite. A state-licensing
regime that displaces both marriage and genetics frees up everyone to think more
creatively about what parenthood should be. Contemporary data suggests that
some marital norms, particularly those involving commitment and
interdependence between adults, facilitate effective parenting. A state-licensing
regime can incorporate those norms without relying on marriage itself.
CONCLUSION
When one pauses to contemplate the momentous social, economic, legal, and
technological changes that have impacted families over the last century, it is
surprising that the way the law establishes parenthood has not undergone more
change. The laws and norms that governed sexual and economic relationships
between men and women have been upended and replaced with laws and norms
that allow much more sex and very different kinds of economic obligation. The
demise, for all but the wealthiest, of jobs that can sustain a single provider
household wreaks havoc with both social and legal expectations for providing
for children. The ways in which children are conceived and cared for are much
more classed and varied, often much less gendered, and sometimes far more
commercial than ever before. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has squarely
rejected the idea that the state has a legitimate interest in ensuring that children
have both a mother and a father.296
295

See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015) (noting that two parents of the
same sex often provide parental love and nurture for children and therefore ruling that the
state does not have a compelling interest in ensuring that a child have both a mother and a
father).
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In trying to incorporate some of these changes, the law has taken incremental
steps without rethinking the entire regime. Those incremental steps have
rendered the regime as a whole incoherent. It makes no sense to draw an
impenetrable line separating how parenthood is determined based on how the
child is conceived. It makes no sense to assume that an adult’s child support
obligation should be based on a two-parent household norm that has never
reflected reality for the adults most affected by its reach. It makes no sense,
given contemporary sexual norms, to assume that two people who decide to have
sex are simultaneously committing to coparenting. And it makes no sense to
exclude vast numbers of adults from parenthood simply because they have no
genetic connection to the child.
The DNA default, as originally conceived, was an attempt to bind men to
children whom the community did not want to support. It does not work. It does
not provide children with lasting, supportive, emotional relationships; it does
not provide children with the resources that they need. What it does instead is
reify a binary heterosexual parenting norm; it roots parenthood in genetics and
thereby establishes that there are two, and only two, parents, one of each gender.
It polices sex by forcing parenthood onto men simply because they had sex with
a woman who chose to maintain the pregnancy, and it ignores the substantially
greater biological investment that women often make in children.
Marriage, the main alternative to the DNA default, continues to serve as a
path to parenthood for a little more than half of the children in the United States.
Children who are raised by their marital parents appear to benefit from their
parents having been married. It is time for the law to embrace what marriage
does right in assigning parentage, so that those children born outside of marriage
have their parentage determined by a regime that facilitates effective and
meaningful parentage, without relying on genetics.
The law has taken incremental steps to create new nonmarital paths to
parenthood that involve neither genetics nor marriage, including licensing
parents through adoption and recognizing binding contracts to share parental
rights with adult partners. Purposefully or not, those incremental steps reflect
the parenting values of formality and mutuality embedded in marriage. At the
margins, through adoption and contract, the law has recognized as parents
nongenetically related adults who are willing to embrace the formality and
mutuality of parenting. In doing so, the law has already provided paradigms that
could fully displace the DNA default and marriage. Whether one’s primary
concern is minimizing the importance of marriage or minimizing the importance
of genetics, it is now time to rethink what should be considered marginal when
it comes to establishing parenthood.

